Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 29
Issue 3
SYMPOSIUM:
Creating and Interpreting Law in a Multilingual
Environmnent

Article 2

2004

The Challenges of Interpreting Multilingual,
Multijural Legislation
Ruth Sullivan

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
Recommended Citation
Ruth Sullivan, The Challenges of Interpreting Multilingual, Multijural Legislation, 29 Brook. J. Int'l L. (2004).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol29/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

File: Sullivan4.23.04macro.doc

Created on: 4/23/2004 4:30 PM

Last Printed: 6/25/2004 12:37 PM

THE CHALLENGES OF INTERPRETING
MULTILINGUAL, MULTIJURAL
LEGISLATION
Ruth Sullivan*
I. INTRODUCTION....................................................................... 986
II. THE REFORM OF CANADA’S STATUTE BOOK ........................ 998
III. INTERPRETING MULTILINGUAL LEGISLATION .................. 1005
A. Legal Status ................................................................ 1005
B. Implications of Equal Authenticity ............................ 1007
C. The Shared Meaning Rule.......................................... 1012
D. Applications of the Shared Meaning Rule ................. 1018
E. What Bilingual Legislation Reveals About Law ....... 1021
IV. INTERPRETING MULTIJURAL LEGISLATION ...................... 1022
A. New Scholarship ......................................................... 1026
B. The Methodology of Harmonization........................... 1035
C. Rules for Interpreting Bijural Legislation ................. 1037
D. Derivative Bijuralism ................................................. 1043
E. The Independence of Language and Law .................. 1045
V. INTERPRETING HISTORICAL TREATIES ............................... 1054
VI. THE LEGISLATION OF NUNAVUT ....................................... 1061
VII. CONCLUSION .................................................................... 1066

File: Sullivan4.23.04macro.doc

986

Created on: 4/23/2004 4:30 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 6/25/2004 12:37 PM

[Vol. 29:3

I. INTRODUCTION

A

fter centuries of imperialism, war and migration, the territory of most modern nations encompasses multiple language and cultural groups.1 However, the extent to which this
diversity is formally reflected in positive law differs from one
nation to another and reflects a range of factors — from the historical evolution of the nation to current demographics and
power relationships. The decision to designate more than one
language as official or to apply more than one legal system
within a nation has important practical consequences and also
carries important symbolic weight. But both the practical and
symbolic significance vary depending on whether the decision to
recognize multiplicity is entrenched in a rigid constitution, is
embodied in ordinary (and therefore amendable) legislation or
is merely a government policy.
The impact of constitutional or legislative recognition of diversity also depends on the response of courts and other official
interpreters to the relevant legal texts. In 1985, for example,
the Supreme Court of Canada was called on to interpret and
apply a provision of the Canadian Constitution that requires
Acts of the Legislature of Manitoba to be enacted in French and
English.2 In its result, the court declared virtually all of Manitoba’s statutes invalid because they were enacted only in English.3 In this case, respect for constitutional values prevailed
over considerations of cost and convenience. The court’s primary concerns were the constitutive role of language in culture
and its relations to law and governance.4 In a subsequent deci-

* Professor, Faculty of Common Law, University of Ottawa.
1. See generally DANIEL NETTLE & SUZANNE ROMAINE, VANISHING VOICES:
THE EXTINCTION OF THE WORLD’S LANGUAGES ch. 2 (2000).
2. Manitoba Act 1870, S.C. ch. 3, § 23 (1870) (Can.).
3. Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 (To avoid legal
chaos, the court suspended the declaration for a period sufficient to allow
Manitoba to prepare and enact a French version of its statute book.).
4. Justice Dickson wrote:
The importance of language rights is grounded in the essential role
that language plays in human existence, development and dignity. It
is through language that we are able to form concepts; to structure
and order the world around us. Language bridges the gap between
isolation and community, allowing humans to delineate the rights
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sion, however, the same court was prepared to uphold legislation incorporating by reference massive amounts of unilingual
material.5 In this case, considerations of cost and convenience
trumped the concern for bilingual community.6
In assessing the impact of multilingualism and multijuralism
in a state, the above-mentioned legal variables are important,
but equally important is the extent to which the official languages and recognized legal systems are embedded in local culture.7 The key questions here are whether it is possible to work,
play and receive services in the recognized languages, and the
degree of harmony between legal and cultural norms.
The significance of these variables can be illustrated by comparing Canada to the United States. Canada became a federal
state in 1867 when the British Parliament enacted the Constitution Act, 1867.8 This Act established a constitutional frameand duties they hold in respect of one another, and thus to live in society.
Id. at 744.
5. See Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 212, 229–
31.
6. The Court wrote:
In [some cases of incorporation by reference], translation is impracticable because of the fact that these standards are continually revised
by the standard setting bodies. It would be difficult for a legislature
to maintain an authoritative translation in the face of this practice.
Sometimes in cases where international or national standards are
used, translations are already available. But where they are not, it
would defeat the purpose of incorporating an outside document to require translation in compliance with [the language requirements of]
s. 23 and, in any event, it is unlikely that translation would guarantee accessibility to materials which are, practically speaking, inaccessible to the majority of citizens because of their technical nature.
Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 212, 230–31.
7. See Denise G. Réaume, Official-Language Rights: Intrinsic Value and
the Protection of Difference, in CITIZENSHIP IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES 245 (W. Kymlicka & W. Norman, eds., 2000). See also Michael Bastarache & André
Tremblay, Language Rights, in THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND
FREEDOMS 653, 672–74 (Gérald-A. Beaudoin & Ed Ratushny, eds., 2d ed.
1989); William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REV. 677, 678–80 (2000); Roderick Macdonald,
Legal Bilingualism, 42 MCGILL L.J. 119, paras. 42–43 (1997) [hereinafter
Legal Bilingualism]; Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, Bijuralism: A Supreme Court of
Canada Justice’s Perspective, 62 LA. L. REV. 449, 450–54 (2002).
8. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867), Vict. 30–31, ch. 3, § 30–31 (U.K.).
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work that is similar in many respects to that of the United
States.9 Both countries are predominately English-speaking,
common law jurisdictions, and both include one internal unit
whose citizens upon joining the federation were Frenchspeaking and whose legal system was civil law.10 This makes
both countries a mixed jurisdiction as that term is understood
in comparative law.11 However, the roles of the French language and the civil law in Canada are very different from their
role in the United States.
In Canada, Francophone civilists have a significant presence
in the country’s national institutions.12 Québec elects seventyfive of three hundred and one members of Parliament, 13 and the
last three long-serving Prime Ministers of Canada have been
Québec lawyers.14 Francophone civilists are also well represented in the federal civil service, which is responsible for developing legislative proposals and drafting the legislative texts
that are submitted to Parliament for enactment.15 Finally, the

9. For example, both are federations established by agreement of former
British colonies in which legislative authority is exercised by a central legislature and the legislative assemblies of the constituents; both are electoral democracies; both are founded on British notions parliamentary sovereignty and
rule of law; both rely on superior courts to enforce constitutional principles
through judicial review. See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 69
(1987).
10. For a discussion of Louisiana, see Roger K. Ward, The French Language in Louisiana Law and Legal Education: A Requiem, 57 LA. L. REV. 1283
(1997).
11. For a discussion of mixed jurisdictions, see Tetley, supra note 7, at 726
& n.250. See also UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA, WORLD LEGAL SYSTEMS, at
http://www.droitcivil.uottawa.ca/world-legal-systems/engmonde.html (last visi
ted Mar. 17, 2004).
12. This is the result of the obligations imposed on government by the Official Languages Act. Official Languages Act, R.S.C, ch. 31 (1985) (Can.).
13. See EUGENE FORSEY, HOW CANADIANS GOVERN THEMSELVES 38 (5th ed.
2003), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/idb/forsey/How_
Canadians_Govern_Themselves-5th_Ed.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
14. The last three long serving Canadian Prime Ministers were the Honourable Pierre Trudeau, Brian Mulroney and Jean Chrétien, respectively. See
CANADA ONLINE, PRIME MINISTERS OF CANADA: CANADIAN PRIME MINISTERS
SINCE CONFEDERATION IN 1867, at http://canadaonline.about.com/library/
bl/blpms. htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
15. For an account of the role of the civil service in the preparation of
legislation at the federal level, see GOVERNMENT OF CANADA PRIVY COUNCIL,
CABINET DIRECTIVE ON LAW-MAKING, at http://www.pcobcp.gc.ca/default.asp?
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nine-member bench of the Supreme Court of Canada, which is
responsible for interpreting and applying all Canadian law, including Québec civil law, has, since 1949, included three civilist
judges.16 The Federal Court and the Tax Court of Canada are
similarly mixed, including both French- and English-speaking
judges with both civil law and common law backgrounds.17
In the United States, despite Louisiana’s French roots and
civil code, neither the language nor the legal system has had
much impact on the making or interpretation of federal law.18 It
appears that neither French nor civil law is formally or substantially present in any of the three branches of government at
the federal level. In my view, this difference is due, at least in
part, to the absence of language rights and duties in the U.S.
Constitution.19
By contrast, section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867 constitutionally obligates the Canadian Parliament to operate and
enact legislation in both French and English.20 This section also
page=publications&Language=E&doc=legislation/lmgcabinetdirective_e.htm
(last visited Mar. 17, 2004) [hereinafter CABINET DIRECTIVE ON LAW-MAKING].
16. Historically, the appointments to this court from common law provinces have been Anglophones, while the appointments from Québec have been
Francophones. In recent years, however, two Francophones from common law
provinces have been appointed along with an Anglophone judge from Québec.
This evolution reflects a recognition of the independence of language and legal
system and an attempt to overcome essentialist connections between French
and civil law on the one hand and English and common law on the other.
17. Both the Federal Court and the Tax Court are federal courts, which are
subject to the obligations imposed by § 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), §§ 16(1) & 19(1); Official Languages Act, R.S.C., ch. 31, §§ 14–16
(1985) (Can.); Federal Courts Act, R.S.C., F.-7, ch. 8, § 5(4) (2002) (Can.). See
also FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002-2003 1, available
at http://www.fct-cf.gc.ca/publications/annual/AnnRep02-03_e.pdf (last visited
Mar. 17, 2003).
18. In the United States, federal law is enacted in English only and no
effort is made to harmonize its provisions with civil law concepts or terminology.
19. See generally U.S. CONST.
20. Section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867 provides:
Either the English or the French Language may be used by any Person in the Debates of the Houses of the Parliament of Canada and of
the Houses of the Legislature of Québec; and both those Languages
shall be used in the respective Records and Journals of those Houses;
and either of those Languages may be used by any Person or in any
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provides that either language may be used in any pleading or
process of the courts established under the Act.21 In 1982, limited rights to receive government services in French or English
and to have one’s children educated in one’s preferred language
were also constitutionally entrenched.22 These rights are implemented and to some degree supplemented through legislation such as the Official Languages Act,23 which is considered to
be human rights legislation and therefore attracts a liberal interpretation.24 They are also enforced by the courts, sometimes
tepidly, but in recent years more vigorously.25 There is a vast
literature, in both French and English, exploring the implications of these rights and assessing both legislative and judicial
attempts to enforce them.26
Pleading or Process in or issuing from any Court of Canada established under this Act, and in or from all or any of the Courts of Québec. The Acts of the Parliament of Canada and of the Legislature of
Québec shall be printed and published in both those Languages.
CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867) § 133. See also CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), §§ 16(1)
17(1) & 19(1). Similar obligations are imposed on New Brunswick by §§ 16(2),
17(2), 18(2) of the Charter and on Manitoba by § 23 of the Manitoba Act.
Manitoba Act 1870, S.C. ch. 3, § 23 (1870) (Can.).
21. Id.
22. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), pt. I. (Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms), §§ 20 & 23.
23. Official Languages Act, R.S.C., ch. 31, § 31 (1985) (Can.).
24. See R. v. Beaulac, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768, paras. 16–17, 22, 25. See also
Arsenault-Cameron v. Prince Edward Island, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 3, paras. 26–28;
Lalonde v. Ontario (Commission de restructuration des service de santé),
[2001] 208 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (Ont. Can.), paras. 131–38.
25. The leading case is R. v. Beaulac, in which Justice Bastarache wrote:
“Language rights must in all cases be interpreted purposively, in a manner
consistent with the preservation and development of official language communities in Canada….To the extent that Société des Acadiens du NouveauBrunswick [Society of Acadians of New Brunswick] [[1986] 27 D.L.R. 4th 406
(Can.)]…stands for a restrictive interpretation of language rights, it is to be
rejected.” R. v. Beaulac, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768, paras. 16–17, 22, 25.
26. A good survey is provided by PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
CANADA 1291–1321 (loose-leaf ed. 2000). See also André Tremblay, Les Droits
Linguistiques [Linguistic Rights], in THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND
FREEDOMS 15-2–15-37 (Gérald-A. Beaudoin & Errol Mendes eds., 3d ed. 1996);
LANGUAGE AND THE STATE: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF IDENTITY (2d ed. 1991);
LES DROITS LINGUISTIQUES AU CANADA [Linguistic Rights in Canada] (Michael
Bastarache, ed. 1986); LANGUAGE RIGHTS IN CANADA (Michael Bastarache ed.
1987).
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Another important reason for the different response to linguistic and legal diversity in the two countries is demographics.
The Francophones of New Brunswick, Ontario, Québec and
Manitoba constituted a significant portion of the population
when those provinces became part of Canada, and their descendents continue to exercise considerable political and economic
clout today.27 By contrast, there was no civilist Francophone
participation in the drafting of the U.S. Constitution. When
Louisiana joined the union, the United States was well established as an English-speaking, common law nation.28 Over the
years, as one of fifty states, and with a relatively small territory
and population, Louisiana has not been well-placed to affect
things at the centre.29
Canada also differs from the United States in the way it has
conducted its relations with Aboriginal peoples. While neither
nation has much to be proud of in this area, Canada has been
slower to recognize the legal norms relied on in Aboriginal culture and to develop ways to accommodate them within its constitutional framework.30 However, two relatively recent events
have given impetus to a new approach. The first is the entrenchment in 1982 of Aboriginal rights, including treaty rights,

27. See CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND INFORMATION ON CANADA, LANGUAGES IN
CANADA, at http://www.circ.ca/en_html/guide/language/language.html (last
visited Mar. 19, 2004); DEPARTMENT OF CANADIAN HERITAGE, MOBILITY, VISITS
AND TRAVEL, at http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/lo-ol/perspectives/english/interests/
EP03d. htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2004) [hereinafter MOBILITY, VISITS AND
TRAVEL]; DEPARTMENT OF CANADIAN HERITAGE, KINSHIP TIES, at
http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/lo-ol/perspectives/english/interests/EP03c.htm (last
visited Mar. 19, 2004).
28. See Ward, supra note 10, at 1290–91.
29. For a general account of the difficulties faced by French civil law in
Louisiana, see Kathyrn Venturatos Lorio, The Louisiana Civil Law Traditions: Archaic or Prophetic in the Twenty-first Century?, 63 LA. L. REV. 1
(2002).
30. For a review of the American record, see FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1982); Vine Deloria, Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the Content and Character of Federal Indian Law, 31
ARIZ. L. REV. 203 (1989); James Zion, Taking Justice Back: American Indian
Perspectives, in ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, ABORIGINAL
PEOPLES AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 309 (1992). For a review of the Canadian
record, see James Youngblood Henderson, Empowering Treaty Federalism, 58
SASK. L. REV. 241 (1994) [hereinafter Empowering Treaty Federalism].
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in the Canadian Constitution.31 This recognition has strongly
affected the judicial approach to interpreting the historical treaties between First Nations and the Crown.32 The second is the
establishment in 1999 of the new Territory of Nunavut, populated largely by the Inuit of Canada’s North.33 This new Territory was established to give a significant measure of selfgovernment to the Inuit as part of a massive land claims
agreement.34 As explained by Nunavut’s first premier, the goal
is to build a government based on traditional Inuit values and
knowledge, with Inuktitut as the working language of the legislature and government.35 While Canada has long been a bilingual, bijural nation, with the establishment of Nunavut it is
poised to become a multilingual, multijural nation.
The success of this (belated) evolution is by no means assured. As suggested above, the survival of a language and a
legal tradition requires various types of support. While not all
of these are within the government’s control, it seems clear that
a degree of government support for the basics of cultural identity is necessary for survival, even if it is not sufficient.36 Con31. “The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of
Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.” CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act,
1982) pt. I. (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 35(1). “This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and
enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.” Id. at § 27.
32. The point is made most forcefully by Justice Cory in R. v. Badger,
[1996] 1 S.C.R. 771, at para. 78. See generally Empowering Treaty Federalism, supra note 30.
33. See Nunavut Act, S.C., ch. 28, § 28 (1993) (Can.).
34. See Agreement Between the Innuit of the Nunavut Settlement Areas
and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, art. 4 (incorporated into law
by the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, S.C. 1993, ch. 29). See also John
Merritt, Nunavut: Preparing for Self-Government, 21 NORTHERN PERSPECTIVES
1, 3–6 (1993), available at http://www.carc.org/pubs/v21no1/nunavut1.htm
(last visited Mar. 17, 2004); Peter Jull, Building Nunavut: A Story of Inuit
Self-Government, 1 THE NORTHERN REV. 59 (1988) (on file with author).
35. See Paul Okalik, The Nunavut Challenge: Working Together, Speech to
the Conference on Governance, Self-Government and Legal Pluralism (Apr.
23, 2003), at http://www.gov.nu.ca/Nunavut/English/premier/press/cgsglp.
shtml (last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
36. Denice G. Réaume, The Demise of the Political Compromise Doctrine:
Have Official Language Use Rights Been Revived?, 47 MCGILL L. REV. 593
(2002) [hereinafter The Demise of the Political Compromise Doctrine]. See
also Michael O’Keefe, New Canadian Perspectives: Francophone Minorities:
Assimilation and Community Vitality, in DEFINING THE CONCEPTS, available at
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stitutional rights and duties must be implemented through appropriately designed and adequately funded initiatives. Courts
must also contribute by offering liberal interpretations of linguistic rights and by enforcing them with effective remedies.
In this Article, I focus on the challenges of interpreting legal
texts that are enacted in more than one language and draw on
more than one legal system. The first challenge facing interpreters of such texts is recognizing and acknowledging difference. It is obvious that French, English and Inuktitut are different languages and that civil law, common law and Aboriginal
law are different legal systems. What is less obvious is how the
differences matter and how they can be dealt with in an appropriate way.
Recognizing and acknowledging difference is challenging because it requires knowledge of “the other.”37 This is difficult for
those who live in the dominant language and tradition, for ordinarily they have no need to know the other. Even when minority rights are constitutionally protected, there is little incentive for those in positions of power to carry out the research and
attempt the transformation of consciousness that knowledge of
this sort entails. This is arduous work, which is normally carried out by members of the minority group who have little
choice in the matter.38 In principle, however, the burden belongs to the official interpreters of legislation.39
Once the lessons of difference are received and understood,
the second challenge facing interpreters is to develop an appropriate response. Possible responses range from assimilation in
http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/lo-ol/perspectives/english/assimil/defining.htm
(last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
37. See generally FRANCO RELLA, THE MYTH OF THE OTHER (2003). For discussion of Aboriginal peoples in North America as “other” see Frank Pommersheim, Liberalism, Dreams, and Hard Work: An Essay on Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 411, at 423.
38. The dominant group in a society is the group that controls goods or
benefits that are necessary or desirable for members of the society to flourish.
The dominant group has no incentive to change, since it already has what it
needs. The burden of change, therefore, falls to the minority whose need motivates its efforts to bridge the gap.
39. In so far as a linguistic community is legally entitled to access law in
its own language, the official interpreters of law have a corresponding obligation to acquire the linguistic skills necessary to give meaningful effect to the
right.
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an effort to achieve unification, to separation in an effort to
achieve equality, to dialogue in an effort to achieve integration.40
In Canada, these possibilities are expressed in terms of both
language and law. Linguistic assimilation is a daily reality for
Aboriginal peoples41 and an ongoing threat for Francophones,
especially Francophones outside Québec.42 To fend off assimilation, there is a strong tendency to establish linguistic dualism –
institutions and practices that are equal-but-separate.43 Only
when linguistic traditions are culturally secure is it possible to
achieve a genuine bilingualism in which the languages enrich
and modify one another through interaction. A similar dynamic
operates in law. Aboriginal law, though not extinct, is in a precarious state,44 while civil law in North America must constantly struggle against assimilation by the common law.45 To
ensure survival, proponents must safeguard the autonomy of
these traditions. Dialogue among legal traditions can occur
successfully only if each speaks from a position of strength.

40. The dialogue leading to integration model is described by Roderick
Macdonald as “legal bilingualism:”
Legal bilingualism would ultimately require bilingualism in all its
practitioners. Rather than encouraging or even allowing two distinct
official legal cultures to form around two languages, the practice of
legal bilingualism would draw on both languages to construct one official legal culture. In Canada today, that official legal culture is neither French nor English, neither civil law nor common law; it is all
these together, with the ambiguity that such complexity implies.
Legal Bilingualism, supra note 7, at 165.
41. See You Took My Talk: Aboriginal Literacy and Empowerment, Fourth
Report of the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, House of Commons,
Dec. 1990, at 105 app. D.
42. See MOBILITY, VISITS AND TRAVEL, supra note 27.
43. Linguistic dualism is described negatively in Legal Bilingualism, supra
note 7, at paras. 6–8, 42–44. Cf. The Demise of the Political Compromise Doctrine, supra note 36, at para. 23, n.32.
44. See Barbara Atwood, Identity and Assimilation: Changing Definitions
of Tribal Power Over Children, 4 MINN. L. REV. 927, 958–62 (1999); John Borrows, With or Without You: First Nations Law in Canada, 41 MCGILL L.J. 629
(1996) [hereinafter With or Without You].
45. See France Allard, The Supreme Court of Canada and Its Impact on the
Expression of Bijuralism, in 3 THE HARMONIZATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION
WITH THE CIVIL LAW OF THE PROVINCE OF QUÉBEC AND CANADIAN BIJURALISM 3
& n.11, at http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/hfl/fasc3/fascicule_3(a)_
eng.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2004).
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Having recognized difference and the possible responses to
difference, the final challenge for interpreters is to strike the
right balance among the possibilities. It is tempting to suppose
that the conflict between assimilation and equality-throughseparation naturally yields dialogue and integration; but there
is no real basis for this supposition. The right interpretive response depends on the legal and cultural framework in which
the legislation operates, the nature and extent of the differences
between the several languages and legal traditions, the ability
of interpreters to recognize and bridge these differences, and
not least the language politics and culture politics of the jurisdiction.
In this Article, I attempt to explore the impact of these variables on interpretive theory and practice. I have several goals.
The first is to describe the well-established principles governing
the interpretation of bilingual legislation in Canada. The second is to describe and comment on some emerging principles
governing the interpretation of bilingual legislation that is also
bijural (common law and civil law). The third is to draw attention to the challenges of interpreting legal texts that exist in
Aboriginal as well as European languages and are grounded in
both Aboriginal and European law. In examining these topics, I
focus on the way legal texts are produced as well as the judicial
response to them. I also consider how the various interpretive
approaches fit into the categories described above — assimilation, equality through separation and dialogue leading to integration.
Part II of this Article comments on some features of the evolution of Canada’s federal statute book. In Parliamentary democracies, the executive branch proposes and drafts most legislation and has responsibility for publishing and managing the
law.46 Individual statutes are treated as self-contained structures reflecting a coherent set of objectives and embodying a
more or less efficient scheme for achieving those objectives.
Statutes are also thought of as comprising a distinct literary
genre; like poems or plays, they are governed by fairly rigid

46. See HOGG, supra note 26. See also CABINET DIRECTIVE ON LAW-MAKING,
supra note 15.
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conventions of style and organization.47 These conventions facilitate comprehension and form the basis for analysis of the
legislative text. The statutes that are part of a jurisdiction’s
law at a given moment constitute its “statute book,” comparable
to the oeuvre of a poet or playwright.48 The statute book is
taken to be a coherent and internally consistent (although not
an exhaustive) statement of the enacting jurisdiction’s law.49
A noteworthy feature of Canada’s statute books at both the
federal and provincial levels is the practice of regular general
revision.50 In a general revision, the legislature authorizes the
executive branch of government to produce an updated version
of the legislation currently in force within the jurisdiction.51
Amendments and repeals since the last revision are incorporated; incoherencies, contradictions and mistakes are corrected;
and the style in which the statutes are drafted is updated and
made uniform.52 Although the substance of the law remains the
same, its form may change quite noticeably.53 The practice of
revision not only facilitates access to legislation but affords the
government a means to communicate its view of law and its responsibilities to the public.54 The presentation of the two official
languages and legal systems of Canada features importantly in
this communication and is examined in Part II.
Part III of this Article sets out the two main rules governing
the interpretation of bilingual legislation in Canada, namely
47. For an account of these conventions, see generally ELMER A. DRIEDGER,
THE COMPOSITION OF LEGISLATION: LEGISLATIVE FORMS AND PRECEDENTS (2d
ed., rev. 1976); G.C. THORNTON, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING (3d ed. 1987).
48. Ruth Sullivan, Some Implications of Plain Language Drafting, 22
STATUTE L. REV. 175, 182 n.13 (2001) [hereinafter Some Implications of Plain
Language Drafting].
49. See Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 1 S.C.C. 42,
para. 27. See also PIERRE-ANDRÉ CÔTÉ, THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION
IN CANADA 308 & nn. 3–6 (2000) [hereinafter THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGISLATION IN CANADA]; RUTH SULLIVAN, SULLIVAN AND DRIEDGER ON THE
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 169, 262 & n.80 [hereinafter SULLIVAN &
DRIEDGER].
50. See Norman Larsen, Statute Revision and Consolidation: History, Process and Problems, 19 OTTAWA L. REV. 321 (1987).
51. Statute Revision Act, R.S.C., 1974-75-76, ch. S- 20. (1985)(Can.).
52. SULLIVAN & DRIEDGER, supra note 49, at 534.
53. Id. at 535.
54. See Some Implications of Plain Language Drafting, supra note 48, at
182–83.
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the equal authenticity rule55 and the shared meaning rule.56 It
explores the rank that should be assigned to them in the pantheon of statutory interpretation rules. It also looks at insights
into the nature of law afforded by legislation drafted in two or
more languages.
Part IV describes the current initiative of the Canadian government to harmonize federal law with the civil law of Québec.
It looks at the new scholarship this initiative has generated,
rooted in a civilist perspective, and the resulting amendments
to Canada’s Interpretation Act. It explores two concepts of bijuralism: suppletive bijuralism, reflecting an equal-but-separate
approach to the two legal systems, and derivative bijuralism,
reflecting dialogue and the possibility of integration. It ends
with a critical analysis of a recent decision by the Supreme
Court of Canada which illustrates how very challenging the interpretation of bilingual, bijural legislation can be.
Part V deals with the interpretation of the historical treaties
between Britain (later Canada) and the First Nations occupying
territory within the current borders of Canada. In interpreting
these treaties, the courts regard the written English version,
rooted in the common law, as constituting the sole text to be
interpreted.57 I argue that in fact treaties are also recorded in
the oral tradition and legal artefacts of the First Nation parties
and these, no less than the written English text, constitute the
55. See THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION IN CANADA, supra note 49, at
324; SULLIVAN & DRIEDGER, supra note 49, at 74–77. The equal authenticity
rule requires
that legislation be enacted or made, and not merely published, in
both English and French….[B]oth language versions of a bilingual
statute or regulation are official, original and authoritative expressions of the law. Neither version has the status of a copy or translation; neither enjoys priority or paramountcy over the other.
Id. at 74–75.
56. For a definition of the shared meaning rule, see infra Part III.C. See
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION IN CANADA, supra note 49, at 326–28;
SULLIVAN & DRIEDGER, supra note 49, at 81–87.
57. Even in cases where the court emphasizes the importance of receiving
evidence of the context in which treaties were signed, including the Aboriginal
version of the treaty as preserved in oral history, the “treaty itself” is identified with the English language text and the Aboriginal version is regarded as
“con-text.” See, e.g., Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911; R. v. Marshall,
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 456.
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official record of the treaty. I also consider the impact this realization should have on the interpretation of the treaties.
Part VI describes the initiatives underway in the Territory of
Nunavut to ensure that residents have access to legislation in
their language of Inuktitut and to ensure that legislation is
rooted in local Aboriginal knowledge and culture. It briefly
speculates on the interpretation problems that may result if
these initiatives prove successful.
II. THE REFORM OF CANADA’S STATUTE BOOK58
In Canada, federal legislation has been bilingual and bijural
from the beginning.59 A particularly challenging feature of the
Canadian situation is that there is not a one-to-one correspondence between the territory where French or English is spoken
and the territory where the civil law and the common law constitute the basic legal system.60 Federal legislation is addressed
to Francophones as well as Anglophones in the common law
provinces and to Anglophones as well as Francophones in Québec.61
Until recently, federal efforts to meet this challenge were inadequate in many respects. Historically, federal Acts and regu58. The descriptions and comments in this part are based primarily on my
observations while working for the Legislative Services Branch of Canada’s
Department of Justice in 1989-1991 and again in 2001-2002. They are also
based on ongoing but informal discussions with federal drafters. However,
they are personal views, which do not necessarily coincide with the position of
the Department of Justice or the views of my contacts there. [hereinafter
Sullivan Observations].
59. As explained below, these features of the federal statute book flow from
the constitutional requirement that federal legislation be enacted in both languages and from the division of legislative powers between Parliament and
the provincial legislatures.
60. Many Anglophones live in civil law Québec; many Francophones live in
common law provinces, especially New Brunswick, Manitoba and Ontario.
See STATISTICS CANADA, at http://www.statcan.ca/start.html (last visited Mar.
16, 2004).
61. See Lionel Levert, Harmonization and Dissonance: Language and Law
in Canada and Europe: the Cohabitation of Bilingualism and Bijuralism in
Federal Legislation in Canada: Myth or Reality?, in 1 THE HARMONIZATION OF
FEDERAL LEGISLATION WITH THE CIVIL LAW OF THE PROVINCE OF QUÉBEC AND
CANADIAN BIJURALISM 6–7 (2d publication 1999), available at
http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/hfl/fasc1/fascicule_1_eng.pdf (last
visited Mar. 19, 2004).
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lations were almost always drafted in English first with a common law context in mind, then translated into French and
adapted — more or less — to Québec’s civil law.62 There were
many things wrong with this practice. First, the translations
often were legally inadequate.63 Second, the quality of the
French often was poor. Because the translators were not lawyers, they lacked the knowledge required to translate legal
ideas, and therefore, were reduced simply to translating the
words.64 This resulted in a French version that preserved English sentence structure and common law drafting style, and
bore little resemblance to the elegance and concision of a civil
code.65 Reliance on translation also led to what might be called
the problem of bureaucratic pre-interpretation. This problem
arises when translators or other bureaucrats (such as statute
revisers) have the power before enactment to resolve ambiguities in the legislative text.66
A third problem with previous drafting practice was that outside Québec, adaptation to civil law was a low priority.67 As a
result, efforts to harmonize federal law with Québec’s civil code
often were haphazard and inadequate. On occasion, appropriate common law and civil law terminology was used in both
language versions.68 More often, the common law term for a
concept, principle or institution was used in the English version, while the civil law term for an analogous (though not necessarily identical) concept, principle or institution was used in
French.69 This technique was favoured, in part, because it
avoided loading the text with legal terminology from two sys62. Id. See also Legal Bilingualism, supra note 7, at para. 30.
63. See e.g., R. v. Tupper, [1967] S.C.R. 589; Levert, supra note 61, at 6;
Legal Bilingualism, supra note 7, at para. 33.
64. Levert, supra note 61, at 6–7.
65. The best illustration of this practice is probably the Criminal Code,
R.S.C., ch. C-46 (1985) (Can.). While the current French version of the Code
improves on previous versions, it remains inadequate.
66. See Larsen, supra note 50, at 341 (noting that “revisers are liable to
wander over the line that divides revision and substantive change.”).
67. See Levert, supra note 61, at 7.
68. For example, “lease of real property or immovables” in English and
“location de biens réel ou immeubles” in French.
69. For example, “agent” in English and “mandataire” in French, “mortgage” in English and “hypotèque” in French. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C46., § 207.1 (1985) (Can.) (regulating “gaming and betting”).
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tems.70 An additional consideration, rooted in Canadian regional politics, was the desire to avoid the backlash that might
result from making prominent room for Québec’s civil law in the
English text. The drawback to this practice was that it ignored
the existence of Anglophones in Québec and Francophones in
other provinces. In symbolic terms, it sent an essentialist message — that French is the language of the civil law and English
the language of the common law. This message invited an
equal-but-separate approach to the federal statute book.
In 1978, in an effort to address at least some of these problems, the federal Department of Justice adopted the practice of
co-drafting, which requires statutes to be drafted simultaneously by both an English and a French drafter.71 Both drafters
receive instructions (in one or both languages) and each produces a draft for review by the instructing department.72
While co-drafting improved the quality of new legislation, it
did nothing for legislation that was already on the books. This
problem was tackled in the 1985 general revision of the Statutes of Canada, in which the French version of many statutes
was rewritten in a more authentic French style.73
Co-drafting was primarily a response to the bilingual character of federal legislation; it was an attempt to create an authentic French text as opposed to a translation that was merely
deemed to be authentic. However, the bijural character of federal legislation complicated the matter. When dealing with legislation that is bilingual but unijural, it is reasonable for the
drafting conventions and style of the single legal system to prevail. When dealing with legislation that is bijural as well as
bilingual, however, a different approach might be expected.
Upon the introduction of co-drafting in Canada, civilist Francophone drafters rightly called into question the imposition of
common law conventions and style on the French language version of federal legislation, and they urged a more civilist ap-

70. See Sullivan Observations, supra note 58.
71. Levert, supra note 61, at 6. Initially, only statutes were co-drafted
while regulations were merely co-reviewed by English and French lawyers
from the Legislative Services Branch. However, increasingly regulations as
well as statutes are co-drafted.
72. See Sullivan Observations, supra note 58.
73. See generally Revised Statutes of Canada, R.S.C. (Can.).
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proach, not to both versions, but to the drafting of the French
version.74
This reform was rejected for a variety of reasons. For one
thing, much federal law is public law, and public law in Canada
(including Québec) is unijural and grounded in the common
law.75 There is no obvious justification for using civil law conventions and style to draft legislation that is grounded in the
common law. Further, to shift back and forth between styles
depending on whether an Act or a provision was judged to create public or private law would be unworkable in practice.
A more fundamental reason for rejecting civil law drafting in
the French version was the desire to preserve the iconography
of the federal statue book, which at that time attempted to
communicate not just the equal validity of the two language
versions but still more their sameness. It was important that
the two versions say the same thing and look the same way on
the page.76 To this end, starting in 1968, the two versions of
federal legislation were presented in parallel columns, English
on the left and French on the right.77 In both versions, each section or subsection set out a rule in a single sentence, with
roughly parallel structure and wording and with identical formatting.78 The parallel sections and subsections began at the
same point on the page and were attended by identical marginal notes and headings.79 If the English version used tabulation or paragraphing, so did the French. While adopting a
civilist approach to drafting the French version of federal legis74. See Sullivan Observations, supra note 58.
75. This results from the fact that English law was introduced into the
territory of what is now Québec by the Treaty of 1763 in which France surrendered the territory to England. In the Québec Act of 1774, civil law was
reintroduced only in respect of “property and civil rights.” The rest of the law
remained English. See 2747-3174 Québec Inc. v. Québec (Régie des permis
d’alcool), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 919, para. 76.
76. See generally, Some Implications of Plain Language Drafting, supra
note 48 (The appearance of sameness is especially important when the readers
of the text are unilingual and therefore unable to rely on comprehension to
determine that they are the same.).
77. See generally S.C. 1968 (Can.); R.S.C. 1970 (Can.) and R.S.C. (Can.).
Before 1968, the French and English versions were published in separate
volumes. Putting them into the same volume obviously encourages dialogue
and integration.
78. See generally R.S.C. 1970 (Can.).
79. Id.
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lation need not have destroyed the sameness of the law, it
would have diminished the appearance of sameness and was
therefore unacceptable.
Although Francophone drafters have not been allowed to
adopt a civilist style of drafting, the historical rigidities of bilingual drafting have been relaxed to a degree. It is no longer necessary for the French version to track the sentence structure
and wording of the English version. In new legislation, the
French version of a section or subsection is often more concise
and significantly shorter than the English version.80 On the
English side, common law drafting has evolved toward a higher
level of generality and abstraction, which has brought it more
in line with civilist style. Since the introduction of co-drafting,
English drafters have been free to follow the lead of their
French co-drafter in including two sentences within a single
section or subsection, in declining to paragraph and the like.
The French-English text is the product of negotiation and compromise, or in some cases, agreement to disagree.81 In fact, it
has become an exercise in dialogue.
During the 1980s, reform of the federal statute book focused
on bilingualism. More recently, the federal government has
turned its attention to bijuralism.82 This interest was sparked
by a number of developments. One was the work done in several provinces and at the federal level to develop adequate
French terminology for common law concepts, institutions and
principles.83 This work responded to Francophone populations
outside Québec and their entitlement to access the law in their
own language. A second, more important impetus was the enactment of the new Civil Code of Québec,84 which came into
force in 1994.85

80. In fact, the French version may contain two sentences to the English
version’s one, and it may ignore the paragraphing of the English version.
81. See Sullivan Observations, supra note 58.
82. See Levert, supra note 61.
83. See, e.g., National Program for the Integration of Both Official Languages in the Administration of Justice, at http://www.pajlo.org (last visited
Mar. 17, 2004).
84. The French spelling of Québec, with its accent aigu, is used in both the
English and French versions of the title.
85. Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. ch. 64 (1991) proclaimed into force on Jan. 1,
1994 by order-in-council no. 712-93, 125 G.O. II, 3589.
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For Québec, this was a national event of great cultural significance. A Civil Code is the expression of the principles upon
which members of a society live in harmony with one another
and it embodies the fundamental values that make that society
distinct. In keeping with Québec’s so-called quiet revolution,
which during the 1960s and 1970s repudiated many conservative values of the past, the new Code extensively changed Québec’s private law.86 This created considerable disharmony with
existing federal legislation, which referred to concepts or institutions from the former code and used its discarded terminology.87 To avoid confusion and uncertainty, a harmonization initiative was required.
In 1993, the federal government created a Civil Code section
within the Department of Justice with a mandate to harmonize
federal legislation with the new code.88 In 1995, it announced a
bijuralism policy.89 In 1997, it launched an ambitious program
to review all existing federal legislation dealing with property
and civil rights to ensure its compatibility not only with Québec’s new code, but with provincial law generally.90
As explained by the Minister of Justice, the federal harmonization program has three goals:
• to reaffirm the unique bijural character of Canadian federalism by making the expression of that character explicit and
visible in federal legislation in both languages[;]

86. As Mario Dion notes, the Civil Code of Québec led to the amendment of
nearly 80% of the provisions of the Civil Code of Lower Canada. Mario Dion,
Civil Code of Lower Canada, adopted pursuant to 29 Vict., ch. 41 (1865)
(Can.), available at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/hfl/fasc1/fascicule_
1c.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2004).
87. Id.
88. For an account of the institutional evolution of the federal harmonization initiative, see Louise Maguire Wellington, Bijuralism in Canada: Harmonization Methodology and Terminology, in 4 THE HARMONIZATION OF
FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND CANADIAN BIJURALISM (2d publication 1999), available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/hfl/fasc4/fascicule_4_eng.pdf (last
visited Mar. 17, 2004).
89. Id. at 22 app. III.
90. The relevant documents are set out as appendices in 1 THE
HARMONIZATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION WITH THE CIVIL LAW OF THE PROVINCE
OF QUÉBEC AND CANADIAN BIJURALISM (2d publication 1999). For the mandate
of the Civil Code Section, see Maguire Wellington, supra note 88, at 21.
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• to strengthen civil law’s rightful place beside common law
in the statute books of Canada[; and]
• to ensure the terminology and concepts of federal legislation and the Québec civil law are compatible.91

This initiative is ambitious in scope and unusually well
funded.92 The government has commissioned extensive research
into a wide range of issues concerning bijuralism and the relationship between federal and provincial law.93 It has also developed a range of drafting techniques suited to the drafting of bilingual, bijural legislation,94 a method for harmonizing existing
federal law with provincial law95 and several new principles of
interpretation.96 Finally, and most ambitiously, it has under-

91. The Honourable Anne McLellan, Speech at the Conference on the
Harmonization of Federal Legislation with Québec Civil Law and Canadian
Bijuralism, (Nov. 24, 1997), at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/sp/1997/
bijur.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2004). For a detailed account of the genesis
and evolution of the program, see Bijuralism and Harmonization: Genesis, in
1 THE HARMONIZATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION WITH THE CIVIL LAW OF THE
PROVINCE OF QUÉBEC AND CANADIAN BIJURALISM (2d publication 1999), available at http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/hfl/fasc1/fascicule_1_eng.
pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2004).
92. See A. Anne McLellan, A Word From the Minister, in 1 THE
HARMONIZATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION WITH THE CIVIL LAW OF THE PROVINCE
OF QUÉBEC AND CANADIAN BIJURALISM v (2d publication 1999), available at
http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/hfl/fasc1/fascicule_1_eng.pdf (last
visited Mar. 19, 2004).
93. For a description of bijuralism and the relationship between federal
and provincial law, see CAN. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CONSULTATION PAPER, PROGRAM
FOR THE HARMONIZATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION WITH THE CIVIL LAW OF THE
PROVINCE OF QUÉBEC 4–8 (1999); CAN. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CONSULTATIONS &
OUTREACH, SECOND SERIES OF PROPOSALS TO HARMONIZE FEDERAL LAW WITH THE
CIVIL LAW OF THE PROVINCE OF QUÉBEC 1 & n.2 (Jan. 2003), at
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/cons/harm/note.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2004,
2004).
94. See CAN. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE LEGISLATIVE BIJURALISM
COMMITTEE (Apr. 4, 1996) (unpublished) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE
LEGISLATIVE BIJURALISM COMMITTEE]. See also Maguire Wellington, supra
note 88, at 8.
95. See Maguire Wellington, supra note 88, at 15.
96. See Interpretation Act, R.S.C., ch. I-21, §§ 8.1, 8.2 (1985), amended by
ch. 4, pt. 2, 2001 S.C. (Can.). For discussion, see Henry Molot, Clause 8 of Bill
S-4: Amending the Interpretation Act, in 6 THE HARMONIZATION OF FEDERAL
LEGISLATION WITH THE CIVIL LAW OF THE PROVINCE OF QUÉBEC AND CANADIAN
BIJURALISM 13–14 (2d publication 1999), available at http://www.canada. Just-
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taken a comprehensive statute and regulation revision, focusing
on the goal of harmonization.97
While these changes to the Canadian statute book are technical and seem remote from the concerns of everyday life, they
have symbolic significance and cultural symbolism , which are
both important in multicultural societies.98 The way in which
the federal statute book is managed is an integral part of the
federal government’s response to the claims of linguistic minorities across Canada and its efforts to defeat the separatist ambitions of Québec.
III. INTERPRETING MULTILINGUAL LEGISLATION
A. Legal Status
In interpreting multilingual legislation, an essential first step
is to establish the legal status of the several language texts.
Some may be translations for convenience only, with no legal
force.99 Others may be official legal texts, enacted as such, but
ice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/hfl/fasc6/fascicule_6(b)_eng.pdf (last visited Mar. 27,
2004).
97. See Marie-Noelle Pourbaix, S-4: A First Harmonization Bill, in 6 THE
HARMONIZATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION WITH THE CIVIL LAW OF THE PROVINCE
OF QUÉBEC AND CANADIAN BIJURALISM 7 (2nd publication 1999), available at
http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/hfl/fasc6/fascicule_6(a)_eng.pdf
(last visited Mar. 19, 2004); Marie-Claude Gervais, Harmonization and Dissonance: Language and Law in Canada and Europe – Program to Harmonize
Federal Legislation with the Civil Law of the Province of Québec, Assumption
of Complementarity and Methodological Issues, in 1 THE HARMONIZATION OF
FEDERAL LEGISLATION WITH THE CIVIL LAW OF THE PROVINCE OF QUÉBEC AND
CANADIAN BIJURALISM 12 nn. 1–2 (2d publication 1999), available at
http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/hfl/fasc1/fascicule_1_eng.pdf (last
visited Mar. 19, 2004).
98. See Adeno Addis, Cultural Integrity and Political Unity: The Politics of
Language in Multilingual States, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 719, 724 (2001) (“To have
one’s language officially affirmed is to be affirmed as a cultural group. This
becomes especially important if one’s language is chosen out of many languages for official recognition and affirmation.”).
99. The Inuktitut version of Nunavut’s legislation is an example, discussed
infra notes 314–20. For discussion in the context of the European Economic
Union, see Susan Sarcevic, Problems of Interpretation in an Englarged European Union, in RODOLFO SACCO, L’INTERPRÉTATION DES TEXTES JURIDIQUE
RÉDIGÉS DANS PLUS D’UNE LANGUE [The Interpretation of Legal Texts Drafted
in More than One Language] (2002) 239, 245–47 [hereinafter THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS].
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subject to an interpretation rule that gives paramountcy to one
or more of the other language texts.100 In the absence of such a
rule, each language version enacted by the legislature is authentic.101 This means that none has the status of a translation;
all are original and equally authoritative expressions of the law.
This is so, it should be noted, regardless of the means in fact
used to prepare the two language versions. The important
point is not whether one text is a translation of the other but
whether a given text has been enacted by the legislature.102
In Canada, the French and English versions of bilingual legislation at the federal and provincial levels are enacted as law
and both are equally authentic.103 In the Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut, the language situation is more complex.104
The Official Languages Act of the Northwest Territories, for
example, requires legislation to be enacted in English and
French and declares that both versions are equally authoritative.105 In addition, however, it declares a number of Aboriginal
languages to be official languages of the territory — Chipewyan,
Cree, Dogrib, Gwich’in, Inuktitut and Slavey.106 Any of these
languages may be used in the legislature and simultaneous
100. Such a rule provides in effect (even if it is more subtle in form) that if
there is a conflict between the two language versions of a provision, a particular language version prevails.
101. See THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION IN CANADA, supra note 49, at
323–26; SULLIVAN & DRIEDGER, supra note 49, at 74–76.
102. See Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, 747.
Of course, it would be possible for a non-enacted language version to be declared authentic, either through legislation or constitutional amendment. For
a seminal account of equal authenticity between language versions, see R.M.
BEAUPRÉ, INTERPRETING BILINGUAL LEGISLATION 5–13 (1986). See also THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION IN CANADA, supra note 49, at 323–26;
SULLIVAN & DRIEDGER, supra note 49, at 74–78.
103. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), pt. I (Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms), sched. B, ch. 11, § 18; Official Languages Act, R.S.C.,
ch. 31, § 13 (1985) (Can.).
104. See Official Languages Act, R.S.Y., ch. 133 (2002) (Can.); Official Languages Act, R.S.N.W.T., ch. O-1 (1988) (Can.); Official Languages Act,
R.S.N.W.T. 1988, ch. O-1, as duplicated for Nunavut by Nunavut Act, S.C., ch.
28, § 29 (1993) (Can.).
105. See Official Languages Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, ch. O-1 § 10(1) (1988)
(N.W.T).
106. See Official Languages Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, ch. O-1 §4 (1988)
(N.W.T.).
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translation (i.e., interpretation as opposed to translation on paper) is provided to ensure that all members of the legislature
understand what is going on.107 Copies of the sound recordings
of legislative debates both in the original and interpreted versions must be provided to members of the public “on reasonable
request.”108 However, there is no obligation to enact legislation
in these languages. There is merely authority to enact regulations to require publication of “a translation of any Act…made
after enactment.”109 Such translations have no legal status; a
person relies on them at their peril.
B. Implications of Equal Authenticity
The first implication of the equal authenticity rule is that in
every case both versions of the legislation must be read by official interpreters such as Ministers, tribunals and courts. An
interpreter cannot know the substance of the law declared by
Parliament until he or she has considered both versions and
resolved any discrepancies between them.110 As a practical matter, if official interpreters must rely on both versions to determine the law, ordinary citizens (or the lawyers who advise
them) are obliged to do so as well.
At first glance, this implication seems problematic, if not absurd. The Constitution requires legislation to be enacted in
French and English, and the equal authenticity rule declares
both language versions to be equally valid and authoritative.
The purpose of these rules is obvious: the legislature is being
made to function bilingually so that ordinary citizens can function unilingually.111 If this is so, why should it be necessary to
read both versions?
The reason both versions must be read, despite their equal
authenticity, is that citizens can safely rely on a single version
only if they can be sure that both say the same thing. And in
107. LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES, OPERATIONS OF
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, at http://www.assembly.gov.nt.ca/visitorinfo/
NWTStyleOfGovernment/Operations.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
108. Official Languages Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, ch. O-1 § 10(3) (1988)
(N.W.T.).
109. Official Languages Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, ch. O-1 §10(2) (1988)
(N.W.T.).
110. SULLIVAN & DRIEDGER, supra note 49, at 77–78.
111. See Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721.

THE
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practice, this assurance can never be achieved. Drafting mistakes are inevitable; and even in the absence of mistake, different language versions can rarely be identical.112 Most of the
time the discrepancies between the two versions are minor and
insignificant, but that is not always the case. To determine
what discrepancies exist and whether they matter, the interpreter must read both versions.113
More fundamentally, however, it is arguable that the primary
purpose of bilingual legislation is not to facilitate unilingual
access to the law, but to build community. To focus on access
leaves out of account the comprehensive body of language rights
protected by the Constitution and by federal and provincial legislatures, of which bilingual enactment and publication is only
one. These include the right to education and to government
services in one’s own language, as well as the right to speak and
be heard in court in one’s own language.114 These rights are best
interpreted in light of one another as part of a comprehensive
scheme. Further, the focus on access does not fully account for
the facts. As Rod Macdonald points out,
…citizens have a legitimate expectation of being able to understand the law that is applicable to them. But this argument simply exhausts itself in multilingual societies such as
Canada. Instrumental effectiveness and moral legitimacy apply just as much to aboriginal peoples and to immigrants who
speak neither French nor English, yet apart from aboriginal
peoples, few have claimed the need for multilingual legislation. The argument, that is, rests primarily on symbolic and
not on instrumental grounds.115

Denise Réaume makes a similar point when she suggests that
the primary purpose of official bilingualism is not to facilitate
112. See Jean Claude Gémar, L’interprétation du texte juridique ou le dilemme du traducteur [The Interpretation of Legal Texts or the Translator’s
Dilemma], in THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 99, at 103–04;
Louis-Philippe Pigeon, La traduction juridique – L’équivalence fonctionnelle
[Legal Translation: The Functional Equivalent], in JEAN CLAUDE GÉMAR,
LANGAGE DU DROIT ET TRADUCTION: ESSAIS DE JURILINGUISTIQUE [The Language of the Law and Translation: Essays on Jurilinguistics] (1982).
113. SULLIVAN & DRIEDGER, supra note 49, at 77–78.
114. See generally CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), pt. I (Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms), §§ 16–23. Note that the nature and extent
of these rights vary among the provinces and territories.
115. Legal Bilingualism, supra note 7, at 138–39, n.71.
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access to law but to promote linguistic security.116 Réaume’s
analysis echoes the preamble of the Official Languages Act,
which mentions the government’s commitment to “enhancing
the vitality and supporting the development of English and
French linguistic minority communities…and to fostering full
recognition and use of English and French in Canadian society.”117 These sentiments are also found in numerous judgments
of the courts.118
On this analysis, the primary purpose of bilingual and bijural
legislation is to promote the viability of French and English cultural communities in Canada, to ensure that both groups feel at
home in the country. Understood in this light, the obligation to
read both language versions of federal legislation, even in
places where little French is spoken, is consistent with the goals
of official bilingualism. At home is a bilingual, bijural place,
where two cultures do not just co-exist in equal but separate
columns but interact with one another in a shared space. The
ideal here is dialogue leading to integration.

116. Denise G. Réaume explains:
Linguistic security requires not only that the use of one’s language
not be made a ground of liability…, but also that the instrumental
usefulness of the language be supported, not merely for the sake of
other ends considered extrinsically [such as access to law], but out of
respect for the intrinsic value of a life lived within a particular linguistic milieu….
…It is fitting that the constitution should seek to make the most important aspects of the country’s political institutions accessible to minority official language communities. The ability to live one’s life in
one’s own language is thereby importantly expanded to include interaction with government agencies and participation in political institutions…. More important, the operation of public institutions in a
minority official language advances the intrinsic expressive interest
in language use by making the state and its institutions full participants in the life of the community, and the members of the group full
participants in public life.
The Demise of the Political Compromise Doctrine, supra note 36, at paras. 44–
45.
117. Official Languages Act, R.S.C., ch. 31 (1985) (Can.).
118. See, e.g., Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721,
744; Ford v. Québec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, 748–49; Mahe v.
Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, 362; R. v. Beaulac, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768, paras. 17,
25.
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A second implication of the equal authenticity rule is that
neither version of bilingual legislation can be favoured over the
other simply on the basis of language.119 Conflicts between the
versions must be resolved, for it would be an unacceptable violation of the rule of law if interpreters were to apply different
rules to citizens depending on which version of the statute they
invoked. However, under the equal authenticity rule, conflicts
are resolved not through a paramountcy rule, but by determining the substance of the law that Parliament intended to enact.120 In some cases this approach may favour the English version, in others the French version, in others neither version.
But in all cases, if one version is preferred over the other, it is
preferred only because it coheres with the court’s interpretation
of the text based on the entire range of interpretive techniques
available to it, and not on the automatic preference for one language over the other.121 The two versions are equal in that both
must be read and considered in comprehending the substance of
the law. They are also equal in that either may be rejected if it
fails to express accurately the substance of the law as determined by the court.122
A third implication of equal authenticity is that the legislative text is comprised of both versions.123 As Nicholas Kasirer
puts it, each version aspires to be a complete and reliable expression of the law, but neither can manage on its own.124 The
two versions are “predicated, as vehicles for meaning, on the ongoing existence and availability of the [other].”125 They are
halves of a single whole, and to access the law properly both
versions must be read and understood.

119. This point is conclusively established in Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, at 777–78.
120. Food Machinery Corp v. Canada (Registrar of Trade Marks), [1946] 5
C.P.R. 76.
121. See Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721.
122. R. v. Cie immobilière BCN, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 865.
123. This point is repeatedly made by the courts. See, e.g., R. v. Mac, [2002]
1 S.C.R. 856.
124. Nicholas Kasirer, Lex-icographie Mercatoria [Lexicography Mercatoria], 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 653, 673 (1999). Kasirer is speaking of a bilingual
lexicon of European contract law, but his point applies equally to bilingual
legislation. Id.
125. Id. at 656.
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If both versions of a bilingual text must be read to determine
the law, it follows that professional interpreters must be bilingual to do their job properly.126 Ideally they must be fully bilingual, which entails not just fluency in both languages but fluency in both cultures as well. While many legal professionals in
Québec are bilingual and a significant number are fully bilingual, that is not the case elsewhere in Canada.127 Absence of
linguistic capacity and cultural knowledge is a major barrier to
achieving the ideal of dialogue and integration. As Rod Macdonald writes,
Numerous factors contribute to the apparently inexorable decay of legal bilingualism into legal dualism: intellectual laziness among legal professionals; rampant unilingualism among
legal elites; a proliferation of mediocre translations of texts; an
educational system that privileges information over understanding; and, not least, a plethora of secondary sources and
computerized finding tools.128

While the factors mentioned by Macdonald are of great importance, I do not agree that bilingualism is decaying into dualism. In truth, Canada has never experienced the legal bilingualism he describes — there is no golden age from which to
decline. I see legal dualism as a necessary (although not a sufficient) condition for achieving legal bilingualism. To move
from dualism toward bilingualism, the factors mentioned by
Macdonald must be addressed — and are being addressed in
modest ways. Although full bilingualism outside Montréal is
relatively rare, the federal government has put significant resources into ensuring that its own lawyers are fluent in both
official languages and are cognizant of both legal systems and
cultures.129 It has also sponsored and published a significant
126. See Tetley, supra note 7, at 727; Legal Bilingualism, supra note 7, at
165.
127. Pierre-André Côté, Bilingual Interpretation of Enactments in Canada:
Principles v. Practice, 29 BROOK J. INT’L L. 1067 (2004).
128. Legal Bilingualism, supra note 7, at para. 43.
129. The federal government sends its lawyers for language training on a
regular basis. Promotion is contingent on linguistic as well as legal competence. Drafters in the Legislative Services Branch are encouraged to complete
the program offered by the University of Ottawa that allows civilists to
achieve a degree in Common Law (in English or French) and common law
lawyers to achieve a degree in Civil Law (in English or French).
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body of legal scholarship on bijuralism, through both government departments and institutions such as Royal Commissions
and the Law Commission of Canada.130 In recent years, opportunities for Francophones and civilists to learn common law and
for Anglophones and common law lawyers to learn civil law
have proliferated in Canadian law schools, at least in the
East.131 Globalization has helped as well, by providing incentives for everyone to recognize the limits of their own small
place in the world.
C. The Shared Meaning Rule
The basic rule that has come to govern the interpretation of
bilingual legislation in Canada is known as the shared meaning
rule. In cases where the two versions of a bilingual statute do
not say the same thing, if one is ambiguous and the other is
clear, the meaning that is shared by both is presumed to be the
meaning intended by the legislature.132 This rule is based on the
fundamental assumption that both versions of a legislative text
must declare the same law.133 To apply different rules to similarly situated persons, depending on some test of language
identification, would violate formal equality and, in disputes

130. All publications of government and government sponsored legal scholarship are in both English and French.
131. Both the University of Ottawa and the University of Moncton offer a
complete program of common law in French leading to a common law degree.
See generally UNIVERSITY OF MONCTON WEBSITE, at http://www.umoncton.ca/
(last visited Mar. 14, 2004). The University of Ottawa offers common law
lawyers a year-long program in English leading to a degree in Civil Law and
civilist lawyers a year-long program in French leading to a common law degree. See generally UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA WEBSITE, at http://www.uottawa.ca/
welcome.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2004). McGill University offers a three
year bilingual program in which graduates simultaneously study both legal
systems and graduate with degrees in both. Several Universities offer civilist
lawyers a year-long program in English. See generally MCGILL UNIVERSITY
WEBSITE, at http://www.mcgill.ca/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2004).
132. The shared meaning rule is discussed at length in BEAUPRÉ, supra note
102, pt. 1, 1–194. See also THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION IN CANADA,
supra note 49, at 326–32; SULLIVAN & DRIEDGER, supra note 49, at 80–94.
133. This follows from the most basic premise underlying the rule of law,
namely that law is the same for all subjects. See R. v. O’Donnell, [1979] 1
W.W.R. 385 (B.C.C.A.).
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between persons with different identifications, could lead to
impasse rather than resolution.134
The shared meaning rule also assumes a one-to-one relationship between the meaning of a legislative text and the law.135
This assumption is much harder to justify. As in other rules
that refer to “the meaning” of a text, it is difficult to know what
kind of meaning the interpreter has in mind: the dictionary
meaning? the literal meaning? the meaning in context? If the
reference is to meaning in context, how much context? To determine whether the two versions of a contested provision say
the same thing, must both versions be read in their entirety?
And are the two versions to be compared before or after other
interpretive efforts, such as scheme analysis or reliance on presumed intent?
The highly inconsistent practice of the courts suggests that
little thought has been given to these questions. They are
rarely addressed in any formal way.136 However, in a recent
case involving interpretation of the Criminal Code, the Supreme Court of Canada had this to say:
In his Interpretation of Legislation in Canada (3rd ed. 2000),
at p. 327, Pierre-André Côté reminds us that statutory interpretation of bilingual enactments begins with a search for the
shared meaning between the two versions. Where the words
of one version may raise an ambiguity, courts should first look
to the other official language version to determine whether its
meaning is plain and unequivocal.
In this case, any ambiguity arising from the English version is
resolved by the clear and unambiguous language of the French
version of [section] 369(b). There is therefore no need to resort

134. Consider the dilemma that would arise if a court were called on to adjudicate between a litigant who relied on the clear meaning of the French
version of a provision and a litigant who relied on the clear meaning of the
English version of the same provision. The facts would be the same for both,
but the applicable rule would differ. To apply a different rule, depending on
linguistic affiliation, would both violate rule of law and fail to resolve the dispute.
135. This assumption is discussed in Legal Bilingualism, supra note 7, at
159.
136. See Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of
Canada, 30 OTTAWA L. REV. 175, at 192, 195 & nn. 45–47 (1998-99) [hereinafter Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada].

File: Sullivan4.23.04macro.doc

1014

Created on: 4/23/2004 4:30 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 6/25/2004 12:37 PM

[Vol. 29:3

to further rules of statutory interpretation, such as those invoked by the Court of Appeal.137

This passage seems to suggest that the shared meaning rule
occupies top spot in a hierarchy of interpretation rules. Interpretation is to begin with a search for the shared meaning and
to end if such a meaning is found. In effect, this analysis adopts
the rhetoric and method of textualism:138 if one version is ambiguous and the other is plain, the plain meaning not only resolves the ambiguity but renders any further interpretive effort
superfluous.
At first glance it might seem that such an analysis is justified
by the equal authenticity rule. If as a matter of constitutional
law the two versions are equal, how can an interpreter validly
reject the meaning found in both in favour of a meaning that is
found in only one of them? And if the shared meaning must be
adopted as a matter of constitutional law, what is the point of
looking at other evidence of legislative intent?
In my view, this analysis is grounded in the faulty assumption that the law enacted by a legislature can be equated with
the meaning of the words used to declare and communicate the
law. Let us suppose that the primary duty of interpreters is to
give effect to the law that the legislature intended to enact in so
far as that intention can be known. The legislature’s intention
is necessarily an inference drawn from reading the text
(whether unilingual or bilingual) in context, having regard to
the purpose of the legislation, the consequences of adopting a
proposed interpretation and admissible extrinsic aids. In drawing inferences, interpreters are obliged to take both language
versions into account. But that does not entail accepting a
shared meaning if there are other more compelling grounds to
infer that some other meaning was intended.139 The language of
a text may or may not be an apt expression of the legislature’s
intention. It may be apt in one language but not in the other.
There is no necessary relation between the clarity of a text and
137. R. v. Mac, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 856, para. 5–6 (emphasis added).
138. For the seminal modern account of textualism, see William N. Eskridge
& Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42
STANFORD L. REV. 321 (1990).
139. R. v. Compagnie Immobilière Ltée., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 865, at 874–75,
paras. 16–17.
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its fidelity to the law that it is meant to declare. In order to
determine what law was intended, interpreters must have access to the full range of techniques used to interpret legislation.140 As the court itself noted in an earlier case, if the shared
meaning of the two versions of bilingual legislation could not be
rejected when it turns out to be implausible, the effect would be
to permit mistranslation or drafting error to trump legislative
intent.141
The Mac case can be used to illustrate the problems that
arise from making shared meaning the definitive basis for inferring intended law. The issue in the case was the proper interpretation of the word “adapted” in section 369(b) of the
Criminal Code:
ENGLISH

FRENCH

369. Every one who…

369. Quiconque…

(b) makes, offers or disposes of or knowingly
has in his possession any
plate, die, machinery, instrument or other writing or material that is
adapted and intended to
be used to commit forgery

(b) fait, offer ou alièner ou
sciemment a en sa possession quelque plaque,
matrice, appareil, instrument ou autre écrit ou
matière adaptés et destinés à servir pour commettre un faux

…

…
est coupable d’un acte criminel….

is guilty of an offence….

Counsel for the Crown argued that “adapted” here means
“suitable for” rather than “physically modified or altered,” and
the court accepted this interpretation.142 It found that although
“adapted” in the English version was ambiguous, “adapté” in
the French version was clear — not because “adapté” normally
means “suitable for” but because the legislature is presumed to
use the same words to express the same meaning and different

140. Id. at 871–72.
141. See Johnson v. Laflamme, [1916] 54 S.C.R. 496, at 504–05.
142. R. v. Mac, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 856, para. 5–6.
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words to express different meanings.143 The court noted that in
section 342.01(1)(d) of the Code, which dealt with a similar offence, the English word “adapted” was rendered in French not
by “adapté” but by “modifié”:
ENGLISH
342.01 (1) Every person who…
(d) possesses
any instrument, device, apparatus,
material or thing that the person
knows has been used or knows is
adapted or intended for use in
forging or falsifying credit cards is
guilty of an offence…

FRENCH
342.01 (1) Quiconque…
d) a en sa possession,
un instrument, un appareil, une
matière ou une chose qu’il sait
utilisé pour falsifier des cartes
de crédit ou en fabriquer des
fausses, ou qu'il sait modifié ou
destiné à cette fin est coupable…d’un acte criminel…

The wording of section 342.01(1) suggests that when the legislature means “physically altered” it uses the word “modifié” in
the French version.144 Since it used the word “adapté” in section 369 it must mean something different, the only possibility
being “suitable for.”145 This, then, must be the shared meaning
of “adapted / adapté” in section 369.146
The first problem with this reasoning is the arbitrary choice
of context. The court might equally have relied on the dictionary meanings of “adapted / adapté” or considered those words in
the context of section 369 alone. Had it taken this approach it
would have judged both versions ambiguous and would have
required a full analysis. Alternatively, it might have enlarged
the context to include other provisions of the Code and discovered that, far from using language consistently, the Criminal
Code is full of inconsistent terminology, the inevitable result of
multiple amendments over the years. The court offers no justification for examining the disputed language in light of section 342.01(1) while ignoring other contexts, the purpose of the
provision and possible extrinsic aids.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at para. 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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A second problem with the court’s approach in Mac is its conclusion that in sections 369 and 342 of the Code, the French
drafter correctly used different words to express an intended
difference in meaning, while the English drafter’s use of the
same words in the two sections was a mistake.147 Once again, no
justification is offered for its conclusion. Perhaps it was the
French drafter who erred by using different terminology to express the same meaning. To determine which version correctly
reflects legislative intent, it is necessary to canvass the entire
body of relevant evidence; focusing on a single feature of the
text is not enough.
The better view, and certainly the more widespread view, is
that the shared meaning rule does not occupy a special position
in statutory interpretation. Despite its constitutional origins,
like the other so-called “rules” of statutory interpretation, it
operates as a principle or presumption. The presumptive character of the shared meaning rule is spelled out very clearly by
Justice Stone in Flota Cubana de Pesca (Cuban Fishing Fleet) v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration):
As the recent decision in Doré v. Verdun (City), [1997] 2 S.C.R.
862 indicates…the shared meaning rule is not absolute.
[Judge] Gonthier maintained, at paragraph 25 [, page 879],
that a court is free to reject a shared meaning if it appears
contrary to the intention of the legislature. To illustrate this
point, Judge Gonthier quoted the following key passage from
R. v. Compagnie Immobilière BCN Ltée, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 865, at
pages 871-872:
…
“[The shared meaning rule] is a guide; it is one of several aids
to be used in the construction of a statute so as to arrive at the
meaning which, ‘according to the true spirit, intent and meaning of an enactment, best ensures the attainment of its objects’….The rule…should not be given such an absolute effect
that it would necessarily override all other canons of construction.”
Thus, the shared meaning principle is not always determinative of the interpretive exercise, and will be discarded if an alternative interpretation leads to a preferable or more acceptable result.
147. Id.
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…
Indeed, the jurisprudence suggests that the courts must continue to employ ordinary principles of statutory interpretation
when construing bilingual legislation. The object of the inquiry, therefore, is to search out and give expression to the
legislature’s intention in light of statute’s purpose, the context
in which it was enacted and other interpretive strategies.148

In short, equal authenticity requires interpreters to give
equal attention to both versions in their efforts to determine
legislative intent. But it does not require them to accept a
shared meaning if there are grounds to believe that some other
meaning was intended. In order to determine whether some
other meaning was intended, they must resort to the full range
of interpretive techniques.
D. Applications of the Shared Meaning Rule
One would think that the shared meaning rule would be most
heavily relied on when the two versions of a statute say the
same thing. Redundancy in the two versions suggests that the
drafters have correctly reproduced their instructions and that
the legislature had a clear and consistent understanding of
what it was enacting, regardless of the version on which it relied. A coincidence of meaning between the two versions is a
strong indicator of legislative intent and is undoubtedly relied
on in practice by conscientious bilingual interpreters. But the
shared meaning rule itself is rarely invoked in these circumstances.149 Rather, it is reserved for cases where there is a perceived conflict between the two versions of the legislative text.
In the case law, the shared meaning rule is invoked and relied on when one language version of legislation is thought to be
ambiguous while the other appears to be clear, and the clear
meaning offers a plausible interpretation of both versions.150
Under these circumstances, the shared meaning offers cogent
evidence of legislative intent and may carry considerable weight

148. Flota Cubana de Pesca v. Canada, [1998] 2 F.C. 303, paras. 20, 21.
149. For a rare exception, see R. v. Barnier, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1124 at para. 11.
150. THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION IN CANADA, supra note 49;
SULLIVAN & DRIEDGER, supra note 49, at 80–87.
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— depending, of course, on how clear and plausible it is and
whether other relevant considerations support or contradict it.151
When the two versions of legislation say different things,
there is no shared meaning and the courts must resort to other
interpretive strategies to resolve the conflict.152 In such cases,
there are three possibilities. The court may adopt one of the
versions on the grounds that it accurately expresses the legislature’s intent while the other is flawed by drafting error.153 It
may conclude that neither version accurately expresses the legislature’s intent and both drafters erred.154 Or it may attempt to
construct an interpretation that is grounded in both versions.155
This last approach is illustrated by Aeric Inc. v. Canada Post
Corp.156 Rather than choosing between the language versions or
rejecting both for some third alternative, the court in Aeric attempts to integrate the two. The issue in the case was the
meaning of the expression “the principal business/l’activité
principale” used in regulations under the Canada Post Corporation Act.157 The applicant argued, on the basis of the English
wording, that only profit-making activities could be considered
in determining the “principal business” of a person.158 The respondent relied on the French version to urge a broader interpretation which would permit consideration of any activity carried on by a person.159 Judge Ryan responded to these arguments by constructing a meaning based on both versions, concluding that the expression “principal business/l’activité principale” referred to non-profit-making activities, but only if these
activities were related to a business carried on by the person.160
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

SULLIVAN & DRIEDGER, supra note 49, at 81–82.
Id. at 90–93.
Id. at 90 n.59.
While this is a theoretical possibility, I am unaware of any examples.
SULLIVAN & DRIEDGER, supra note 49, at 86–87.
Aeric Inc. v. Canada Post Corp., [1985] 1 F.C. 127 at para 60.
Canada Post Corporation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-10 (1985) (Can.).
Aeric Inc. v. Canada Post Corp., [1985] 1 F.C. 127.
Id. at para. 37.
As the Aeric court explained:

...the use of the term “l’activité principale” in the French version of
para. (h) gives support to a wide reading of “principal business.” On
the other hand, the use of “principal business” in the English version
suggests that “l’activité principale” should be read in a somewhat
more restricted way than a literal reading might suggest.
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When one version of the legislation is broader in scope than
the other, it is sometimes said that the narrower meaning
should be preferred since this meaning is shared by both versions.161 However, this analysis has been repeatedly rejected by
the courts.162 Unless the broader version is ambiguous and the
narrower version is clear, there is no basis for invoking the
shared meaning rule under these circumstances.163 The proper
approach when the scope of the versions differs, and both are
more or less clear, is to rely on other interpretive techniques.
Two conclusions result from this brief survey. First, the
shared meaning rule is normally invoked only at points of pathology in the preferred language text. In practice, the equalbut-separate model dominates. Second, when the shared meaning rule is invoked, the interpreter is called on not just to apply
the text, but to establish it — to redraft it in effect. This has

Id. at para. 62.
161. See, e.g., R v. Hinchey, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1128, at 1157; Schreiber v. Canada, [2002] SCC 62, at para. 56; R. v. Daoust, [2004] SCC 6, at para. 26.
162. For a review of the relevant cases, see Paul Salembier, Rethinking the
Interpretation of Bilingual Legislation: The Demise of the Shared Meaning
Rule?, OTTAWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (on file with author). See also
SULLIVAN & DRIEDGER, supra note 49, at 82–83.
163. Courts frequently rely on THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION IN
CANADA, supra note 49, at 327 to justify their claim that when one version is
broader in scope than the other, the common meaning is the narrower one.
However, Côté has repudiated this position. Côté writes:
Il y a lieu de faire observer que si la prévalence de la version claire sur
la version ambiguë se justifie rationnellement, puisque l’on doit présumer que la meilleure expression de la volonté législative est celle qui
est exempte d’ambiguïté, il en va autrement de la prévalence de la version restreinte: il n’y a, à notre avis, aucun motif rationnel de préférer
le sens le plus restreint, car rien ne permet d’affirmer qu’il représente
mieux l’intention législative que le sens large. [It is worth noting
that while the primacy of the clear version over the ambiguous version is rationally justified, for one must presume that the better expression of the legislature’s will is the one that is free of ambiguity,
the same cannot be said of the primacy of the narrow version: in my
opinion, there is no rational basis to prefer the narrow meaning, for
there is no justification for saying that it is a better expression of the
legislature’s will than the broader meaning.]
Pierre-André Côté, L’Interpétation des textes légilatifs bilingue au Canada
[The Interpretation of Bilingual Legislative Texts in Canada], in THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 99, at 12 (2002), (emphasis
added).
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implications for the way we understand legislative text and the
role of the judge in interpretation.
E. What Bilingual Legislation Reveals About Law
Bilingual legislation draws attention to aspects of legislation
that courts tend to ignore since they don’t sit well with the official mythology of statutory interpretation. First, it focuses attention on the way legislation is prepared and whose intentions
in fact govern the way a legislative scheme is struck and legislative rules are formulated. In Canada, in practice, the legislature has a relatively modest role to play. The more important
players are the Cabinet, which initiates all government sponsored legislation,164 the bureaucrats in the sponsoring department who prepare the proposal to the Cabinet and instruct the
legislative drafters,165 and the drafters themselves who not only
help determine the scheme and wording that bests gives effect
to the instructions they have received, but also administer departmental duties such as ensuring that proposed legislation
accords with the rule of law and other constitutional norms.166
This focus on the realities of legislative preparation invites
courts to pierce the legislative veil, so to speak, and to receive
evidence or take judicial notice of how a particular piece of legislation was made — the drafting process and conventions current at the time of enactment, the time frame in which the bill
was drafted and the real possibility of mistake. Were courts to
pierce the legislative veil, they would quickly encounter the
problem of bureaucratic pre-interpretation that arises when
legislation is prepared in one language and subsequently translated into another, or when legislation is redrafted in the context of a statute revision. In both situations a bureaucrat is
effectively given the task of resolving ambiguity in the existing
legislative text without the benefit of interaction with instructing officers or legislative committees. Equally disconcerting, in
both situations the bureaucrat is well positioned to create inadvertent conflict between the two language versions by misunderstanding the original text or offering an infelicitous translation or revision.
164. See supra note 15.
165. Id.
166. See Sullivan Observations, supra note 58.
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A second effect of bilingual legislation is that it forces interpreters to distinguish the law enacted by the legislature from
the words of the legislative text, in other words, to acknowledge
that the wording of a text does not embody or contain the law
but is merely a basis for inferring the law.167 Even though the
two versions of a legislative text say different things, they are
nonetheless taken to express the same rule of law.168 This is
possible only because the enacted law is not equivalent to the
text, but is a construction inferred from reading the words of
the text in context and relying as well on other evidence of legislative intent. This recognition is important because it undermines the basic assumption underlying textualism, namely that
law is contained in the words of the legislative text.169
IV. INTERPRETING MULTIJURAL LEGISLATION
Like the United States, Canada is a bijural federation in the
sense that it contains internal jurisdictions most of which apply
the common law but one that applies civil law, at least in private law matters.170 In both countries as well, there are areas
where Aboriginal law and institutions have a growing role to
play.171 This creates challenges for legislatures, which must ensure that their enactments mesh in an appropriate way with
the other legal systems within the federation.
Québec’s first civil code came into force in 1866, a year before
Confederation.172 At Confederation, under the federal - provincial division of powers established by the Constitution Act,
1867, the provinces retained jurisdiction over matters of property and civil rights in the Province, subject to Parliament’s
paramount jurisdiction over matters explicitly assigned to the

167. See THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION IN CANADA, supra note 49, at
327; Legal Bilingualism, supra note 7, at para. 47.
168. Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038.
169. See Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada, supra
note 136, at 203 & n.245.
170. See generally LA. REV. STAT. ANN. vols. 16–17 (1972 & Supp. 2000);
Civil Code of Québec, ch. 64, 1991 S.Q. (Can.).
171. See supra note 29 and authorities cited therein.
172. Civil Code of Lower Canada, adopted pursuant to 29 Vict., ch. 41 (1865)
(Can.), available at http://www.canadiana.org/citm/specifique/lois_e.html (last
visited Mar. 4, 2004).
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federal Parliament.173 These include bankruptcy, marriage and
maritime law — matters that would otherwise come within
property and civil rights.174 Parliament also has jurisdiction
over matters such as criminal law, federal taxation and federal
Crown liability, each of which necessarily interacts with provincial law governing property and civil rights.175
In legislating about matters within its jurisdiction, Parliament can create its own concepts and institutions, declare its
own doctrines and governing principles and devise its own
rules.176 Federal legislation is paramount over provincial law to
the extent of any conflict.177 However, even though Parliament,
when acting within its jurisdiction, is legally entitled to disregard provincial law,178 as a practical matter it could not and
would not want to do so. In most cases the best way to achieve
federal objectives in areas involving property and civil rights is
to make use of existing provincial law concepts, institutions,
and principles. Since these may be different in Québec and the
common law provinces, federal legislation that draws on provincial law is bijural — and multijural to the extent law reform in
the common law provinces proceeds along varying paths. Even
when Parliament opts for unijuralism and creates a single federal regime that is meant to operate uniformly throughout the
country, if the legislation deals with property or civil rights, at
some point it must come in contact with provincial law.
Rod Macdonald has suggested that in a federal system legislatures have a duty to minimize conflict and incoherence between national and local law.179 Arguably this is an aspect of
the rule of law. However, when legislatures fail to discharge
173. See CAN. CONST. (The Constitution Act, 1867) pt. IX, § 129. Under section 129, pre-existing law was continued until altered by the appropriate legislature. Id.
174. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867), § 91 (setting out “matters”
assigned to Parliament).
175. Id.
176. See HOGG, supra note 26, at 307–08.
177. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867) § 91.
178. This follows from the doctrines of sovereignty and paramountcy.
179. Roderick A. Macdonald, Harmonizing the Concepts and Vocabulary of
Federal and Provincial Law: The Unique Situation of Québec Civil Law, in
THE HARMONIZATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION WITH THE CIVIL LAW OF THE
PROVINCE OF QUEBEC AND CANADIAN BIJURALISM 29, 41–42 (1997) [hereinafter
Harmonizing the Concepts and Vocabulary of Federal and Provincial Law].
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this duty, the task falls to the courts and must be managed
through interpretation.
The challenge for courts is to identify the ways in which and
the extent to which particular legislation is bijural and to factor
that analysis into their interpretation. There is a range of possibilities here.
(1) Federal legislation may expressly incorporate by reference
a clearly identified set of provincial rules. For example, the
rules governing vehicular traffic on federal property are the
rules of the province in which the property is situated.
(2) Federal legislation may create a scheme designed to work
within provincial law. For example, the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act presupposes that the legal relations between a
bankrupt person and his or her creditors have been fixed by
provincial law; it merely declares the consequences of those relations in situations of bankruptcy. The federal rules are superimposed on provincial law.
(3) Federal legislation may use terms of art from both common
law and civil law — for example “real property and immovables / biens réels et immeubles” — with the intention of relying on the common law in the common law provinces and on
civil law in Québec.
(4) Federal legislation may use a term of art from the common
law — for example, exemplary damages — with the intention
of relying on the common law in both common law provinces
and Québec. The reverse is equally possible, although historically it rarely has occurred.
(5) Federal legislation may create a new concept or institution
or declare a new principle that is intended to displace provincial law. Such a concept, institution or principle might draw
on both common law and civil law sources, on international
law or Aboriginal law, or it might be an original creation.180

Possibilities 1-3 describe legislation that is bijural in a suppletive sense: the provincial law of both the common law provinces and Québec is relied on to supplement, that is, to explain
or complete, federal legislation. The result is that federal law
may have somewhat different effects in different provinces.
180. For other analyses of the range of possibilities, see Maguire Wellington, supra note 88, at 3 & n.7; REPORT OF THE LEGISLATIVE BIJURALISM
COMMITTEE, supra note 94.
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Suppletive bijuralism is the chief focus of the federal harmonization program and it promotes an equal-but-separate model of
bijuralism. By contrast, possibilities 4 and 5 refer to legislation
that is unijural in the sense that the rule set out in the federal
text is meant to have the same meaning and apply in the same
way throughout Canada.181 Any concept, institution or principle
referred to in a unijural rule must be given the same meaning
in all the provinces. However, the meaning given to this uniform concept, institution or principle may itself be bijural (or
multijural) in a derivative sense; that is, it may be derived from
two (or more) legal sources. This form of bijuralism is based on
the model of dialogue and integration.
Historically, the challenges of working with two legal systems
in a federal state have been felt much more in Québec than
elsewhere in Canada.182 The main factor here is the dominance
of the common law at both the federal and provincial levels.
Public law throughout the country is unijural common law.183
Further, when Parliament wants to impose a uniform rule to
govern a private law matter within its jurisdiction, it typically
has relied on common law sources.184 This allows for the easy
harmonization of federal and provincial law in the common law
provinces but creates major problems for Québec. Another factor was the modest attention paid to developing effective techniques for drafting bijural legislation.185 This, combined with
the poor quality of the French language version, often made it
difficult for interpreters to discern Parliament’s intent in relation to Québec.186 Finally, there was the gradual but significant
erosion of the Civil Code of Lower Canada as a complete and

181. My use of the term “unijural” differs from that of the Department of
Justice, which uses it in a derivative sense to refer to terms or concepts derived from the common law alone or the civil law alone.
182. Most of the case law addressing harmonization problems comes from
Québec. SULLIVAN & DRIEDGER, supra note 49, at 94.
183. See supra note 75.
184. At least that was the case in the past. It remains to be seen whether
the harmonization program, along with other factors such as globalization,
will work to produce a more balanced approach.
185. See supra note 7.
186. See, e.g., Deputy Minister of Rev. (Que) v. Rainville, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 35,
41.

File: Sullivan4.23.04macro.doc

1026

Created on: 4/23/2004 4:30 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 6/25/2004 12:37 PM

[Vol. 29:3

authentic embodiment of Québec’s jus commune.187 This erosion
was caused in part by reliance on common law cases to interpret the Code, first by the Privy Council and later by the Supreme Court of Canada, whenever a concept or rule set out in
the Code seemed to be more or less the same as a common law
concept or rule.188 Such reliance not only distorted the substantive law of the Code but also undermined civil law methodology
by focusing on precedent instead of doctrine.189 Another contributing factor was the Québec legislature’s reliance on ordinary statute, rather than Code amendment, as a tool of law reform.190 The absence of a fully functioning civil code made assimilation to the common law that much easier.191
On January 1, 1994, the Civil Code of Québec came into force
and created an opportunity to address these historical problems.192 The federal government has responded to this opportunity in a serious and comprehensive way. While its response
has many dimensions, this Article focuses on the creation of
new scholarship with a civil law emphasis, the methodology of
harmonization, the interpretation of harmonized legislation,
derivative bijuralism and the independence of language and
law.
A. New Scholarship
In 1993, in anticipation of the new code, a Civil Code Section
was established within the Department of Justice.193 It began
its work by organizing a series of studies and reports.194 The
Section commissioned academic lawyers to write papers analyzing the constitutional framework within which harmonization
occurs in Canada, exploring points of contact between federal
187. See Roderick A. Macdonald, Encoding Canadian Civil Law, in THE
HARMONIZATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION WITH QUEBEC CIVIL LAW AND
CANADIAN BIJURALISM 164–70 [hereinafter Encoding Canadian Civil Law].
188. See Allard, supra note 45, at 3–7.
189. See id. at 8.
190. See Encoding Canadian Civil Law, supra note 187.
191. Id.
192. See Dion, supra note 86.
193. See Maguire Wellington, supra note 88, at 2, app. II.
194. These are described in CAN. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CONSULTATIONS &
OUTREACH, SECOND SERIES OF PROPOSALS TO HARMONIZE FEDERAL LAW WITH THE
CIVIL LAW OF THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC, at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/
cons/harm/note.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2004, 2004).
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and civil law and recommending policies to govern the work of
harmonization and interpretation of the finished product.195
Two important things emerge from these studies: first, a set of
concepts and principles concerning harmonization within a federal system, including most notably the concepts of complementarity and dissociation, and second, a set of techniques for dealing with bijuralism in a bilingual jurisdiction.
1. Complementarity versus Dissociation: a Civilist Coup
A striking feature of the scholarship commissioned by the
government is its nearly exclusive reliance, in the early stages
at least, on civil law lawyers to develop the policies, methodologies and interpretation rules designed to govern the relationship between federal legislation and provincial law — not only
the law of Québec, but the law of all the provinces and territories.196 The harmonization of federal and provincial law in Canada is evolving as a largely civilist project, based on assumptions that are remote from common law thinking.197 There is
irony here, and more than a little poetic justice.198 One can
195. The academic papers have been collected in a series of published collections.
See CAN. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE HARMONIZATION OF FEDERAL
LEGISLATION WITH THE QUÉBEC CIVIL LAW AND CANADIAN BIJURALISM,
COLLECTION OF STUDIES 165–68 (1997); CAN. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
HARMONIZATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION WITH THE CIVIL LAW OF THE PROVINCE
OF QUÉBEC AND CANADIAN BIJURALISM (2nd publication 2001), available at
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/hfl/table.htm (last visited Mar. 20,
2004); Didier Lluelles, Harmonization of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act
with Québec Civil Law: Editor’s Comment, 37 REVUE JURIDIQUE THEMIS 1 & 2
(2003); Marc Cuerrier et al., Canadian Bijuralism and Harmonization of Federal Tax Legislation, 51 CAN. TAX J. 1 (2003) (special issue on the harmonization of the federal income tax with Québec civil law).
196. The Harmonization Program was initially a project of the Civil Code
Section of the Department of Justice, even though it was designed not only to
adapt federal legislation to the new Civil Code but also to ensure the French
version of federal legislation operates appropriately in common law Canada.
The contributors to the first collection of studies were all jurists from Québec.
Yet the amendment to the Interpretation Act developed by the Section applies
to the whole of Canada. This amendment is set out and discussed below.
197. For example, the notion of a pre-existing, self-contained and coherent
jus commune, which lies at the heart of the Harmonization Program, is a
civilist notion.
198. Since Confederation, Québec has had to adapt to a unilingual, common
law based conception of federal law, with little appreciation by the rest of
Canada of the difficulties involved. As a result of the Harmonization Pro-
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readily appreciate the impulse of Québec scholars to do everything possible to secure the borders of the new civil code. Nonetheless, I believe that this exclusively civilist orientation in the
federal harmonization project is a mistake. Ignoring the common law, or assuming that it is identical to civil law, is no less
inappropriate than ignoring civil law and its significant differences. Furthermore, the civilist approach to harmonization has
implications for the development and interpretation of federal
legislation that in my view are unfortunate.
The assumptions underlying the federal harmonization project are well expressed by Jean-Maurice Brisson and André Morel in an influential paper prepared for the Department of Justice in 1995, in which they assert the following:
[T]he relationships between the civil law and federal legislation are fully analogous to those between Québec statutes and
the Civil Code. The latter…establishes…the jus commune. As
such, it is called on to complement “other laws, although other
laws may complement the Code or make exceptions to it”.199
The same is true of federal legislation when it deals with some
issues of private law; the civil law may add to it, in which case
there is a relationship of complementarity between the two, or
the federal statute may, on the contrary, derogate from the
private law, in which case there is a dissociation between
them.200

gram, common law Canada may now encounter some adaptation difficulties of
its own.
199. Brisson and Morel here refer to the preliminary provision of the Civil
Code of Québec, which provides in full:
The Civil Code of Québec, in harmony with the Charter of human
rights and freedoms and the general principles of law, governs persons, relations between persons, and property. The Civil Code comprises a body of rules which, in all matters within the letter, spirit or
object of its provisions, lays down the jus commune, expressly or by
implication. In these matters, the Code is the foundation of all other
laws, although other laws may complement the Code or make exceptions to it.
Civil Code of Québec, ch. 64, 1991 S.Q. (Can.) (preliminary provision).
200. Jean-Maurice Brisson & André Morel, Federal Law and Civil Law:
Complementarity and Dissociation, in CAN. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE
HARMONIZATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION WITH QUÉBEC CIVIL LAW AND
CANADIAN BIJURALISM, COLLECTION OF STUDIES 2, 217 (1995) (emphasis added).
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Brisson and Morel go on to point out that in all the provinces,
because the private law of the province (whether civil law or
common law) constitutes the jus commune, federal law is essentially dependent on provincial law. Whereas the jus commune
is a coherent and autonomous system of law, statutes are essentially departures from the jus commune; they may alter or add
to a particular rule or principle, but ultimately they operate
within the established terms, principles and institutions of the
jus commune. Brisson and Morel conclude:
Whenever a federal statutory provision uses a private law concept without defining it or otherwise assigning some specific
meaning to it, and whenever a statute falls short of comprehensively governing a question of private law or lacks a formal
incorporating provision, the omission must be remedied by referring to one of the two legal systems in force.201

This analysis has become the major article of faith underlying
the current harmonization program. In a recent consultation
document concerning the second series of harmonization proposals, the Department declares:
The bijural status of Canada and its legislation, coupled with
the fact that federal legislation, taken as a whole, does not
constitute an autonomous legal system, means that when Parliament is silent on the meaning to be given to a private law
expression to which reference is made, it is necessary to refer
to the applicable provincial private law for interpretation.
This is known as the principle of complementarity. Furthermore, a standard or rule of provincial law will supplement a
federal statute that is silent on a question relating to property
and civil rights. The provincial private law is then applied in
a suppletive manner to the federal statute. For example,
when reference is made in a federal statute to the concept of
lease without any further qualification, it is the private law of
the province that will provide, on a suppletive basis, a definition of this concept. Similarly, a federal statute that does not
provide specific rules with respect to successions will be interpreted, on a suppletive basis, according to the rules of provincial private law.
201. Id. at 30. See also Jean-Maurice Brisson, L’impact du Code civil du
Québec sur le droit fédéral: une problématique [The Impact of the Civil Code of
Québec on federal law: an examination of the issues], 52 R. DU B. 345, 352–53
(1992).
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However, federal law may derogate from private law and establish its own rules and the federal rule may then become or
more or less autonomous. This is called a relationship of dissociation.202

While these analyses are not inaccurate, in my view they are
inadequate. First, they leave out of account the ordinary role of
judicial interpretation in completing legislation, not only in
common law systems but in civil law systems as well. Second,
they imply that derogations from private law are anomalous
and exceptional. This verges on essentialism203 and supports a
conservative approach to law.
The distinction between complementarity and dissociation
developed by Brisson and Morel partly tracks an important distinction in common law between reform legislation and program
legislation.204 While reform legislation is designed to operate
within the context of the common law,205 program legislation
relies on autonomous principles and original institutions to give
effect to legislative policies.206 Progressive legislative initiatives
often seek to displace the common law with legislative schemes
that reflect new approaches to issues such as labour relations
(union legislation) or automobile insurance (no-fault schemes).207
Not only is there nothing anomalous or exceptional about such
legislation, but it is a standard tool of reform. In interpreting
202. CAN. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, INTRODUCTORY NOTE – PUBLIC CONSULTATIONS,
SECOND SERIES OF PROPOSALS TO HARMONIZE FEDERAL LAW WITH THE CIVIL LAW
OF THE PROVINCE OF QUÉBEC, at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/cons/harm/
note.html (last viewed Jan. 15, 2004).
203. Essentialism is the view that language and legal culture are intimately
and inextricably linked such that it is impossible to produce an authentic
common law in French or an authentic Civil Code in English. For discussion,
see Elmer Smith, Peut-on faire de la common law en français? [Is It Possible to
Do Common Law in French?], 3 R.DE L’UNIVERSITÉ DE MONCTON 39 (1979);
Jean-Claud Gémar, L’interprétation du texte juridique ou le dilemme du traducteur [The Interpretation of Legal Texts or the Translator’s Dilemma], in
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 99, at 103 (2002).
204. See Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 369 (1989); Frank P. Grad, The Ascendancy of Legislation:
Legal Problem Solving in Our Time, 9 DALHOUSIE L. J. 228, 251 (1985).
205. SULLIVAN & DRIEDGER, supra note 49, at 201.
206. Id. at 202.
207. See, e.g., Canada Labour Code, R.S.C., ch. L-2 (1985) (Can.); Statutory
Accident Benefits Schedule – Accidents on or After Nov. 1, 1996, O. Reg. 403/
96, enacted under the Insurance Act, R.S.O., ch. 18 (1990) (Can.).
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such legislation, before turning to the common law, the courts
appropriately look to the principles and policies that are expressly set out or are implicit in the legislative scheme.208
The final (and most important) point is that there is no reason why the federal Parliament, acting within its jurisdiction,
should favour reform legislation or seek to preserve the jus
commune of the provinces. Obviously, a major reason for giving
jurisdiction over a matter to Parliament in the first place was to
displace variable provincial law with uniform federal law. This
purpose must be taken into account when dealing with federal
legislation. All this is ignored in the Brisson – Morel analysis.
2. Techniques for drafting bijural legislation209
As mentioned above, a key challenge in interpreting Canadian federal legislation is to determine whether Parliament intended a given provision to be bijural or unijural. The way in
which a provision is drafted can be a good indicator of legislative intent. Consider the following:
DRAFT NO.
1

ENGLISH
an act of God

2
3

an act of God
a fortuitous or
uncontrollable cause
unforeseeable and
uncontrollable
circumstances.

4

FRENCH
cas fortuit ou
force majeur
un acte de Dieu
cas fortuit ou
force majeur
des circonstances
imprévisible et
irrésistible.

In common law “an act of God” is a legal term of art;210 in civil
law “cas fortuit or force majeur” is similarly a legal term of
art,211 but it differs from its common law analogue in recognizing
the acts of third parties as a potential cause of non-liability.212

208. See SULLIVAN & DRIEDGER, supra note 49, at 202.
209. The account which follows is based on REPORT OF THE LEGISLATIVE
BIJURALISM COMMITTEE, supra note 94. See also Maguire Wellington, supra
note 88, at 8–10.
210. See PHILIP OSBORNE, THE LAW OF TORTS 306 (2000).
211. See Civil Code of Québec, ch. 64, Art. 1470, para. 2, 1991 S.Q. (Can.).
212. See Gulf Oil Canada Ltd. v. C.P.R., [1979] C.S. 72, 75 (Que.).
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In Draft 1 above, the common law term of art is used in the
English version and the civil law term of art is used in the
French version. This drafting technique normally signals that
the common law concept is to be applied in the common law
provinces and the civil law concept is to be applied in Québec.213
This was the primary method used to create bijural texts before
2001.214
In Draft 2, the common law term of art is used in the English
version and a translation of that term is used in the French
version, ignoring the civil law analogue. This drafting technique signals that the common law concept is meant to be applied in Québec as well as the rest of Canada.215 In Draft 3, we
have the obverse: the civilist term is translated into English,
ignoring the common law analogue. Again, this suggests that a
single rule — in this case the civil law rule — is meant to apply
across the country.216
In Draft 4, existing terms of art from both systems are
avoided. This drafting technique invites interpreters to devise
an understanding of the language that is rooted in the purpose
and context of the legislation in which the language appears.217
This understanding might draw on both common and civil law,
and other sources as well.
In its review of bijural drafting techniques, the harmonization program focused on developing alternatives to the technique used in Draft 1, in which common law terminology is used
in the English text while civil law terminology is used in the
French version. It was looking for alternative ways to create
texts that are bijural in the suppletive sense explained above.218
From a practical perspective, its purpose was to ensure that the
213. This understanding is codified in section 8.2 of the federal Interpretation Act. See Interpretation Act, R.S.C, , ch. I-23, § 8.2 (1985) (Can.).
214. This drafting approach is reflected in section 8.2 of the original Official
Languages Act. See Act of July 9, 1969, ch. O-2, §8(2)(c), 1970 S.C.
(Can.)(repealed).
215. See, e.g., Novotny Estate v. R., [1994] 2 C.T.C. 2274, para. 12.
216. I am unaware of any example of this in federal legislation.
217. This drafting approach might be adopted in legislation designed to
implement international treaties or land claim agreements with Aboriginal
peoples.
218. See REPORT OF THE LEGISLATIVE BIJURALISM COMMITTEE, supra note 94,
at 3, 12; Wellington, supra note 88, at 8 & n.24. Suppletive bijuralism is explained supra at p. 41.
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text of federal legislation gives meaningful access to the law for
Francophones in common law Canada and Anglophones in
Québec. 219 At a symbolic level, its purpose was to tell readers of
the statute book that Canada is a bilingual, bijural place.220 The
following sets out the techniques canvassed by the project.
TECHNIQUE

ENGLISH

FRENCH

Single Term
Fits All

contract
“contract” is the English term both for civil
law and for common
law contracts.
It
should be understood
to refer to civil law in
Québec and common
law elsewhere.
real property or
immovables
“real property” is the
English term for the
common law concept
while “immovables” is
the English term for
the analogous civil law
concept. In the English version, the common law term comes
first.

contrat
“contrat” is the French
term for both civil law and
common law contracts. It
should be understood to
refer to civil law in Québec
and common law elsewhere.

Doublets

immeubles ou biens réel
“immeubles” is the French
term for the civil law concept while “biens réel” is
the French term for the
analogous common law
concept. In the French
version, the civil law term
comes first.

219. “The policy on legislative bijuralism aims at providing Canadians with
federal legislative texts that will reflect, in each linguistic version, the legal
system in use in their province.” Maguire Wellington, supra note 88, at 22
(quoting the Canadian Department of Justice’s Policy on Legislative Bijuralism).
220. See McLellan, supra note 92, at v.
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TECHNIQUE

ENGLISH

FRENCH

Partial
Doublet

mortgage or
hypothèque
“mortagage” refers to a
common law security
interest in real property while “hypothèq
ue” refers to an analogous civil law security
interest in immoveables.
“liability” means
(a) in the Province
of Quebec, extracontractual civil liability, and
(b) in any other
province, liability in
tort.
accept security for
payment222
This phrase applies to
all forms of security
available under any
provincial law.

hypothèque
In French, a single expression “hypothèque” is used
to refer to the civil law
security interest in immoveables and the analogous common law interest
in real property.

Paragraphed
Doublet221

Generic
Language

" responsabilité " :
(a) dans la province de
Québec, la responsabilité civile extracontractuelle;
(b) dans les autres provinces, la responsibilité
dilictuelle.
accepter des garanties
pour le paiement
This phrase applies to all
forms of security available
under any provincial law.

It will be noted that each of these techniques presupposes
complementarity rather than dissociation. The project did not
address methods for expressing the intention to create unilingual federal law.

221. A paragraphed doublet can be used to set out either definitions or
rules.
222. This language is broad enough to encompass both common law and
civil law ways of securing payment as these exist from time to time. This
method is preferred by drafters because it is less cumbersome and eliminates
the need to amend the federal text when provincial law changes.
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B. The Methodology of Harmonization223
The federal harmonization program applies to both new and
existing legislation.224 To deal with new legislation, federal
drafters have received training in the techniques of bijural
drafting described above, and federal bills with a significant
private law component are vetted by specialists in the Civil Law
Section of the Department of Justice.225 To deal with existing
legislation, the Civil Law Section has undertaken a revision of
the federal statute book to ensure that its references to the law
of property and civil rights are appropriately harmonized with
Québec’s new Civil Code. Close to half of federal statutes will
have to be amended as a result of this initiative.226
The harmonization revision has the strengths and weaknesses of all revisions. On the plus side, it gives the government a chance to correct drafting mistakes and infelicities in its
legislation and to implement new drafting policies.227 It is thus
a way of adapting the statute book to evolving notions of law
and the state’s relation to those it governs. The current initiative tells Québeckers that the federal government recognizes
the importance of the new Civil Code and will go to considerable
trouble to ensure respect for its autonomy. It also tells the linguistic minorities in Québec and the rest of Canada that their
interests matter. As mentioned above, these symbolic statements are important in multilingual, multicultural societies.228
The down side of a revision process is that it effectively hands
the power to resolve interpretation issues to bureaucrats instead of courts. Under the federal harmonization program, the
lawyers who staff the program must review federal legislation
to determine the relationship between federal legislation and
provincial law.229 They must consider whether this relationship
is adequately expressed, having regard to the principles of com223. For a detailed account of the methodology of harmonization, see
Maguire Wellington, supra note 88, at 3–8.
224. Id. at 8, 13.
225. See Gervais, supra note 97, at 12.
226. Id. at 12.
227. See SULLIVAN & DRIEDGER, supra note 49, at 533–34.
228. For discussion of the symbolic dimension of the statute book, see Some
Implications of Plain Language Drafting, supra note 48, at 182–87.
229. See Maguire Wellington, supra note 88, at 6; Gervais, supra note 98, at
12.
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plementarity and dissociation, the terminology of the new Civil
Code, and the terminology of the common law in French.230 Finally, they must propose amendments to existing federal law
when, in their view, the existing text of federal legislation fails
to express what they take to be the correct relationship between
federal and provincial law.
The practice of allowing bureaucrats to resolve interpretation
issues before they come to the attention of the courts is troubling for a number of reasons. First, bureaucrats generally lack
the experience and expertise of judges. Historically, in Canada
most revision work has been carried out by non-lawyers. Second, revision work goes on in private, without explanation or
meaningful review. Although modern revisions are subject to
legislative scrutiny, this scrutiny is minimal at best. Legislatures lack the time and incentive to second guess the sort of
work carried out in a revision, especially on the vast scale of a
general revision. In principle, this should not matter since the
changes proposed by revisors are purely technical; although the
form of the law may change, the substance remains the same.
In practice, however, revision work often involves substantive
change. Revisors are called on to resolve ambiguities, correct
drafting errors and modernize legislative style. To carry out
these tasks, they must interpret the existing legislative text,
and in doing so they inevitably rely on their own linguistic intuitions, which may or may not be informed by appropriate legal and social knowledge.
These concerns are addressed to some extent in the current
harmonization program. The program’s staff consists of lawyers with expertise in civil law and comparative law and the
Department consults widely with scholars and the general public.231 In addition, the Department publishes what it calls biju-

230. See Maguire Wellington, supra note 88, at 4–7; Gervais, supra note 98,
at 16.
231. For a description of the consultation, see CAN. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
CONSULTATION PAPER, PROGRAM FOR THE HARMONIZATION OF FEDERAL
LEGISLATION WITH THE CIVIL LAW OF THE PROVINCE OF QUÉBEC, 6–8 (1999). See
generally PUBLIC CONSULTATIONS DOCUMENT, SECOND SERIES OF PROPOSALS,
PROGRAM FOR THE HARMONIZATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION WITH THE CIVIL
LAW OF THE PROVINCE OF QUÉBEC, 4–6 (2003).
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ral terminology records.232 These describe the bijuralism problems that have been detected in a federal statute, summarize
the research carried out in response, and explain the reasoning
behind each solution adopted.
While reassuring to a degree, these measures do not address
the most disturbing feature of the current harmonization program. This is its strong preference for supplementive bijuralism as reflected in the principle of complementarity — as opposed to derivative bijuralism (or multijuralism) reflected in the
principle of dissociation. The terminology records do not refer
to factors such as legislative purpose and scheme, avoiding absurd outcomes or the conventions on which analysis of legislative text is normally based. Instead of attempting to establish
the intended relationship between federal and provincial law by
referring to the range of relevant factors, they assume a relationship of complementarity. This narrow, single-dimensional
approach to the interpretation of federal legislation departs
quite significantly from the standard, multi-dimensional approach practiced by the courts.233
C. Rules for Interpreting Bijural Legislation
The most significant work of the harmonization program to
date has been the addition of the following provisions to the
federal Interpretation Act:234

232. These records are found at CAN. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BIJURAL
TERMINOLOGY RECORDS, CIVIL LAW AND COMPARATIVE LAW SECTION
LEGISLATIVE SERVICES BRANCH, available at http://Canada.justice.gc.ca/en/
ps/bj/harm/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2004).
233. The leading case is Re Rizzo v. Rizzo Shoes, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27.
234. Interpretation Act, R.S.C., ch. I-21, §§ 8.1, 8.2 (1985), as amended by
Harmonization Act, No. 1, ch. 4, 2001 S.C. (Can.).
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unless otherwise provided by
law, if in interpreting an enactment it is necessary to refer
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to be adopted in the Province
of Québec and the common law
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be adopted in other provinces.
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FRENCH
8.1. Le droit civil et la common law font pareillement autorité et sont tous deux sources
de droit en matière de propriété et de droits civils au Canada
et, s'il est nécessaire de recourir à des règles, principes ou
notions appartenant au domaine de la propriété et des
droits civils en vue d'assurer
l'application d'un texte dans
une province, il faut, sauf règle
de droit s'y opposant, avoir
recours aux règles, principes et
notions en vigueur dans cette
province au moment de l'application du texte.
8.2. Sauf règle de droit s'y opposant, est entendu dans un
sens compatible avec le système
juridique de la province d'application le texte qui emploie à
la fois des termes propres au
droit civil de la province de
Québec et des termes propres à
la common law des autres provinces, ou qui emploie des termes qui ont un sens différent
dans l'un et l'autre de ces systèmes.

Sections 8.1 and 8.2 each contain three distinct provisions.
The first is contained in the opening words of section 8.1, which
assert that the common law and civil law are equally authoritative sources of law in Canada.235 Thus, when courts encounter
original federal terminology — i.e., terminology that does not
obviously belong to either the common or civil law — they must
not presume that Parliament intended to adopt a common law
235. See Molot, supra note 96, at 13.
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concept, institution or principle.236 Rather, they must presume
that Parliament gave as much consideration to civil law as it
did to common law in devising its own concept, institution or
principle. One system is not favoured over the other.
However, the opening words of section 8.1 do not make common law and civil law the only sources of federal law. Parliament may draw on the concepts, institutions or principles of
other systems of law, including not only international law, but
also Aboriginal law and the law of foreign jurisdictions.237 Parliament may also create concepts, institutions or principles that
do not derive from any existing system of law, or that begin in
but go beyond their source in an existing system of law.
The second provision in section 8.1 establishes that federal
references to provincial law are ambulatory rather than static.
When a federal law refers to a provincial rule, principle or concept, it refers to that rule, principle or concept as it exists in the
province of application “at the time the enactment is being applied [au moment de l’application du text].”238 I find this language difficult to understand. Presumably it refers to the time
when the legally relevant facts occurred. Presumably there is
no intention to alter existing temporal application rules, but
merely to ensure that references to concepts, institutions or
rules of provincial law are understood to refer to provincial law
as it exists from time to time.
I must acknowledge, however, that my reading of the second
part of section 8.1 is much narrower than that of other commentators. It is widely assumed that that the second part of the
provision (along with section 8.2) effectively enacts into law the
principle of complementarity.239 I reject this assumption. In my
236. Id. at 14.
237. Id.
238. See Marie-Noelle Pourbaix, S-4: A First Harmonization Bill, in 6 THE
HARMONIZATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION WITH THE CIVIL LAW OF THE PROVINCE
OF QUÉBEC AND CANADIAN BIJURALISM 7, (2nd publication 2001), available at
http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/hfl/fasc6/fascicule_6(a)_eng.pdf
(last visited Mar. 19, 2004); Molot, supra, note 96, at 15.
239. In the consultation paper on harmonization published by the Department of Justice in 1999, the following appears:
These rules [§§ 8.1 and 8.2 of the Interpretation Act] are designed to
recognize the suppletive role of civil law and the common law in federal law and to entrench bijuralism….The first provision is designed
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view, properly understood, section 8.1 does not codify the principle of complementarity.
The first thing to notice is that section 8.1 does not state that
provincial law applies unless it is expressly excluded by federal
legislation. Rather, the provision states that provincial law applies if (1) “in interpreting an enactment it is necessary/ il est
nécessaire to refer to a province’s rules, principles or concepts….”240 and (2) the law does not provide otherwise. The first
task then is to decide if a reference to provincial law is necessary in order to make sense of the enactment and to apply it to
particular facts. In a paper prepared for the federal government on the harmonization of federal tax legislation with provincial law, David Duff writes:
…[T]he first condition, that it must be “necessary to refer to a
province’s rules, principles or concepts forming part of the law
of property and civil rights” to interpret the enactment,…would seem to be satisfied where the enactment relies
on or employs a concept with an established private law meaning that is not defined in federal legislation, relies on private
law rules or principles to define the legal relationship to which
it applies, or is silent on a matter that is governed by a specific
provincial rule forming part of the law of property and civil
rights. Since the enactment cannot be applied without relying
on the private law rules, principles or concepts, it follows that
it is “necessary to refer to [them].”241

to expressly recognize Canadian bijuralism and to expressly recognize
the complementarity of federal law and the provincial law of property
and civil rights.
CAN. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CONSULTATION PAPER, PROGRAM FOR THE
HARMONIZATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION WITH THE CIVIL LAW OF THE PROVINCE
OF QUÉBEC, PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS, at 10 (emphasis added).
This understanding is supported by the preamble to the Federal Law – Civil
Law Harmonization Act, No. 1 and in particular the fourth recital which
states: “Whereas the provincial law, in relation to property and civil rights, is
the law that completes federal legislation when applied in a province, unless
otherwise provided by law…” Federal Law—Civil Law Harmonization Act,
No. 1, ch. 4, preamble, 2001 S.C. (Can.).
240. Interpretation Act, R.S.C., ch. I-21, § 8.1 (1985), amended by ch. 4, pt.
2, 2001 S.C. (Can.).
241. David Duff, The Federal Income Tax Act and Private Law in Canada:
Complementarity, Dissociation and Canadian Bijuralism, 51 CAN. TAX. J. 1, 48
(2003).
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The unstated assumption here is that in interpreting a federal enactment, judges have no jurisdiction to develop and apply distinctly federal concepts or principles based on their reading of the federal text in the context of Canadian law generally
(both federal and provincial) as well as in the context of other
sources. In other words, the only legitimate legal context for
interpreting federal legislation that deals with property or civil
rights is provincial law and more particularly the jus commune
embodied in the Civil Code in Québec or scattered through case
law and legislation in the common law provinces. With this
approach, as pointed out by Brisson and Morel, the relation between federal law and provincial law is the same as the relation
between ordinary Québec legislation and the Civil Code of Québec.242 The jus commune is established at the provincial level,
while federal legislation is a loi d’exception.
There are several threads of thought here. First, there is the
undeniable fact that legislative texts are always incomplete and
require interpretation.243 As Rod Macdonald writes, “No statute,
not even a civil code…is self-sufficient. There will always be
some body of unenacted law that provides the normative support for the terms, concepts and institutions enacted by legislation.”244 The job of the interpreter can be seen as bringing support to the text in order to complete it. The challenge is identifying the relevant support.
A second thread is the notion of a jus commune comprising a
coherent, complete and self-contained legal system. This obviously reflects a civilist conception of law. Macdonald helps us
understand the significance of the notion by distinguishing
among the following overlapping, but distinct categories:
(1) Common Law: the legal tradition including equity that
originated in England and was introduced into most British
colonies; (2) common law: a method of making new law through
court judgments; (3) unenacted law: principles, policies and concepts derived by interpreters from constitutional texts, international conventions, legislation, doctrine, case law, custom and

242. Brisson & Morel, supra note 200, at 217.
243. For discussion, see Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of
Canada, supra note 136, at 208–10, (1998–99).
244. Harmonizing the Concepts and Vocabulary of Federal and Provincial
Law, supra note 179, at 44.
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shared public values; (4) jus commune: the body of rules, principles and concepts that constitute the foundation of a jurisdiction’s private law; and (5) suppletive law: the law relied on to
complete an incomplete legislative text.245
There is no doubt that interpreting federal legislation requires reference to suppletive law, and that the suppletive law
should not automatically be Common Law as defined above. It
is also clear that in the absence of federal legislation there is no
jurisdiction in federal court judges to create common law in areas of federal jurisdiction.246 The key issue raised by the harmonization project is whether judges can create unenacted law
in the course of interpreting federal legislation.247 In my view,
the answer to the question must be yes. However, the principle
of complementarity (as explained by Brisson, Morel, Duff and
others) answers no. It asserts that the suppletive law must be
the jus commune of the province. Although there is room for
unenacted law at the provincial level in interpreting the Civil
Code, it is precluded at the federal level.
This approach protects the integrity of Québec’s new code,
and one can readily appreciate its attractiveness to Québec jurists. In my view, however, it is unacceptable. First and foremost, it rules out the possibility of unenacted law at the federal
level. In both practice and principle, the creation of unenacted
law is a normal by-product of proper interpretive practice, not
only in common law jurisdictions but in civil law jurisdictions as
well. It can be eliminated only by imposing inappropriate and
probably impossible constraints on interpreters. Second, this
approach to the interpretation of bijural legislation is rooted in
a conception of bijuralism in which complementarity is seen as
the default position and dissociation (notice the negative connotations of the term) as the sole alternative. This conception is

245. Encoding Canadian Civil Law, supra note 187, at 145.
246. The cases cited for this proposition are Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Québec
North Shore Paper Co, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1054; R. v. McNamara Construction
(Western) Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 654; Canada v. Foundation Co. of Canada,
[1980] 1 S.C.R. 695. In my view, these cases address the narrow issue of the
jurisdiction of the Federal Court under § 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and
do not in fact rule out the possibility of federal common law, still less federal
unenacted law.
247. The point is addressed by Allard, supra note 45, at 21–25.
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inadequate because it ignores the possibility of derivative bijuralism. This possibility is explored in the next section.
D. Derivative Bijuralism
While the federal harmonization program has focused primarily on suppletive bijuralism, a number of recent papers explore the potential of derivative bijuralism. France Allard has
written persuasively on this subject. She points out that in a
number of areas (for example, family law, labour law and human rights legislation), the Supreme Court of Canada has
sought to develop a uniform approach to legal problems that is
grounded in both civil and common law. She characterizes this
approach as a dialogue:
In family law, and more particularly with regard to child custody, the Court has seen fit to consider common law decisions
in its civil judgments and vice versa, while recognizing the
conceptual differences of the concepts in both traditions….
Furthermore, when the issue before the Court concerns universal values, there is a more pronounced tendency to mention
the rules and solutions of either tradition….
The dialogue between the traditions in the Supreme Court’s
decisions is consistent with the idea that the Supreme Court is
more than a court of appeal for each of the provinces….In its
decisions and particularly the most recent ones, the Court appears to be motivated by a desire to consider the effect of its
decisions in all jurisdictions, both civil and common law, while
respecting the characteristics particular to each of them.
In these new directions taken by the Court, there appears to
be a more pronounced reciprocal influence between traditions
as comparative analysis becomes increasingly prominent it its
judgments. There is also a more marked tendency toward
universalism in the basis for solutions and in the solutions
themselves….This kind of unification through persuasion is
very different from the unification of the law as it was exercised at the turn of the twentieth century, when unification
generally meant assimilation of civil law by common law.248

Daniel Jutras points out that there are various ways in which
common law and civil law interact in the judgments of Cana248. Id. at 20–21.
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dian courts.249 First, there is the “comparative reference,” in
which the court surveys other jurisdictional approaches to the
problem before the court.250 Such references are largely academic; they do not affect the way the court analyses the case.
Second, there are judgments in which the court explores the
way an issue is handled in civil and common law with a view to
seeking the best solution to the problem at hand.251 Finally,
there are judgments in which “the duality of sources is inherent
in the very issue under consideration.”252 A good example is case
law interpreting the Canada Shipping Act, which draws on both
legal traditions.253
These and other surveys of Canadian case law reveal the real
possibility and potential benefits of a derivative bijuralism or
multijuralism in which federal legislation is routinely interpreted in light of all relevant legal systems (e.g., common law,
civil law, Aboriginal law, Islamic law, international law). As
Patrick Glenn writes:
[The] tradition of comparative law is simply an attempt to find
a better solution, the discovery of which can never stop the
further search for an even better solution. In this search, no
source can be ruled out, as the Supreme Court did to a certain
extent in the first half-century of its existence. And since
sources cannot be excluded in creating a new law, they cannot
be excluded any more in the continuation of one’s own law.
Sources must be judged on their merits.254

249. See Daniel Jutras, Emerging Issues in Private Law: A Case of CrossFertilization, paper presented to the National Judicial Institute Conference on
Bijuralism, (Apr. 4, 2003). For a survey of recent case law in which the Supreme Court of Canada has addressed both legal systems in resolving private
law disputes, see generally Louise Lavallée, Bijuralism in Supreme Court of
Canada Judgments Since the Enactment of the Civil Code of Québec, in 3 THE
HARMONIZATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION WITH THE CIVIL LAW OF THE PROVINCE
OF QUÉBEC AND CANADIAN BIJURALISM (2d publication 1999), available at
http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/hfl/fasc3/fascicule_3(a)_eng.pdf
(last visited Mar. 19, 2004).
250. Jutras, supra note 249, at 3.
251. See, e.g., Transamerica Life Ins. Co. of Can. v. Goulet, [2002] 1 S.C.R.
719; Transamerica Life Ins. Co. of Can. v. Oldfield, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 742.
252. Jutras, supra note 249, at 3.
253. See, e.g., Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437.
254. H. Patrick Glenn, Le droit comparé et la Cour supreme du Canada
[Comparative Law and The Supreme Court of Canada], in MELANGES LOUIS-
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E. The Independence of Language and Law
In interpreting legislation enacted in more than one language, the goal is to establish a uniform rule that applies to
everyone. People belonging to different language groups cannot, because of discrepancies in the several language versions,
claim to be governed by different rules.255 However, when interpreting legislation that applies to multiple territorial units
within a federation, the goal is different. In Canada at least,
Parliament is able to make different rules for different provinces, and it may often have good reason to do so.256 In interpreting bijural (or multilingual) legislation, therefore, the goal
is not to establish a uniform rule but rather to determine legislative intent, specifically to determine whether Parliament intends its rule to operate in the same way throughout the country, to operate differently from one province to the next, or to
operate differently in Québec than in the rest of the country. If
there is reason to believe that Parliament intended a uniform
rule, the next task is to establish the content of that rule, having regard for all possible sources of law — civil, common, Aboriginal, international and foreign.
In interpreting legislation that is bilingual and bijural (or
multilingual / multijural), it can be difficult to distinguish the
issues relating to language from those relating to law. The
complexity involved in interpreting such legislation is well illustrated by the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General),257 which is the court’s
first pronouncement on bijuralism since the enactment of the
Federal Law - Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1.258 In Schreiber, the court appropriately explores both the common law and
civil law concepts referred to in the legislation to be interPHILIPPE PIGEON, OUVRAGES COLLECTIFS [Collective Works] 211 (1989) [original quote in French].
255. This would violate the rule of law. See SULLIVAN & DRIEDGER, supra
note 49, at 80–81.
256. See id. at 95.
257. Schreiber v. Can., [2002] 3 S.C.R. 269.
258. “The Court of Appeal for Ontario did not have the benefit of a clarifying
amendment to s. 6(a) of the Act by the Harmonization Act, which came into
force on June 1, 2001, a few months after the decision of the Court of Appeal
for Ontario was rendered.” Schreiber v. Can., [2002] 3 S.C.R. 269, at para. 66;
Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1, ch. 4, 2001 S.C. (Can.).
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preted;259 however, its decision to apply the civil law concept
rests on dubious reasoning.
In 1999, in accordance with the extradition treaty between
Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany, Germany asked
Canada to arrest and detain Karl Heinz Schreiber, a Canadian
citizen, for the purpose of extradition.260 Acting under a warrant
issued by an Ontario court, Schreiber was arrested in Toronto
and held for eight days before being released on bail.261 Schreiber subsequently brought an action in the Ontario courts
against Germany and Canada seeking damages for the loss of
liberty and loss of reputation suffered as a result of his arrest
and detention.262 Germany moved for dismissal of this action on
the ground of sovereign immunity.263 Section 3 of the State Immunity Act provides that a foreign state is immune from the
jurisdiction of any Canadian court, subject however to certain
exceptions.264 Schreiber maintained that his action was within
the exception for proceedings relating to personal injury set out
in section 6 of the Act in the following terms:
ENGLISH

FRENCH

6. A foreign state is not im- 6. L’État étranger ne bénéficie
pas de l’immunité de jurimune from the jurisdiction
diction dans les actions déof a court in any proceedcoulant
ings that relate to
(a) des décès ou dommages
(a) any death or personal
corporels survenus au
injury, or
Canada;
(b) any damage to or loss of
(b) des dommages matériels
property that occurs in
survenus au Canada.265
Canada.
The issue for the court was whether the distress, humiliation
and loss of freedom experienced by Schreiber as a result of his
arrest constituted “personal injury — dommages corporels”
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Schreiber v. Can., [2002] 3 S.C.R. 269, at paras. 38–46, 58–65.
Id. at para. 2–3.
Id. at para. 3.
Id. at para. 4.
Id. at para. 5.
State Immunity Act, R.S.C., 1980-81-82-83, c.95 s.1 § 3 (1985)(Can.).
Id.
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within the meaning of the Act.266 In the analysis below, I am
critical of how the Supreme Court of Canada addressed this issue and I suggest an approach to interpreting federal legislation
that would avoid the serious problems in the judgment.
When interpreting bijural federal legislation, the first task is
to decide whether the language to be interpreted is ordinary —
i.e. draws on the conventions of language shared by the general
community — or is legal — i.e. refers to specialized legal concepts, institutions or principles.267
(1) If the language is ordinary, in the absence of a provision to
the contrary, the interpreter must establish the single rule
that is meant to apply uniformly across the country.
(2) If the language is legal, the interpreter must determine
whether the concept, institution or principle referred to is bijural (in the suppletive sense) or unijural. In making this determination, the interpreter must have regard to section 8.2 of
the Interpretation Act, which provides that a text that contains both civil law and common law terminology or terminology that has a different meaning in common and civil law is to
be considered bijural, unless the law provides otherwise.268
(3) If the reference is bijural, the interpreter must adopt the
common law meaning in the common law provinces and the
civil law meaning in Québec, as provided by section 8.2 of the
Interpretation Act.
(4) If the reference is unijural, the courts must determine
whether the legal concept, institution or principle derives from
the common law, the civil law, both common and civil law, international law or some other source or combination of
sources. Having determined the source of the reference, the
courts must apply it uniformly — as much as possible —
throughout the provinces and territories. As noted above, the
adoption of a unijural solution to a particular problem does not
effectively avoid bijuralism. First of all, the unijural solution
may itself rely on bijural sources, and second, in most cases

266. Schreiber v. Can., [2002] 3 S.C.R. 269, at paras. 12, 38.
267. This step is necessary because the problem of bijuralism arises only
with legal language.
268. Section 8.2 of the Interpretation Act was not in force when Schreiber
was decided. It will be interesting to see how, if at all, it affects judicial
analysis.
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the unijural solution merely postpones the interaction between
federal and provincial law.

In the Schreiber case, it might have been possible to regard
the language at issue as ordinary rather than legal. The expression “personal injury” could be understood outside a legal
context as referring to any harm suffered by an individual,
while “dommages corporels” could be understood (perhaps) as a
reference to bodily harm. Moreover, from a legal perspective,
both terms are problematic: “personal injury” is ambiguous and
“dommages corporels” is eccentric.269 Nonetheless, neither term
is likely to be used outside a legal context.
Once a court is satisfied that it is dealing with legal terms,
the next step is to determine whether the legal terminology in
question is bijural or unijural. In the Schreiber case, given the
purpose of the State Immunity Act, the presumption of compliance with international law and the wording of section 6, there
is a strong basis for concluding that the terms “personal injury /
dommages corporels” are unijural, grounded in international
law.
The purpose of the State Immunity Act is to implement, to
the extent judged appropriate by Parliament, Canada’s international law obligations concerning the conduct of foreign states
and their representatives in Canada. These obligations are the
same regardless of the province in which the activities of a foreign state or its representatives occur. Furthermore, the wording of section 6 significantly tracks the relevant international
law materials. Article 11 of the European Convention on State
Immunity refers to loss of immunity “in proceedings which relate to redress for injury to the person or damage to tangible
property/ lorsque la procédure a trait à la reparation d’un
prejudice corporel ou matériel.”270 Article 12 of the Draft Articles
on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property excludes immunity in proceedings to compensate “for death or
injury to the person or damage to or loss of tangible property /

269. It is eccentric in that references to injury or harm to the person normally use the term “préjudice” and references to damages for injury or harm
to the person normally use the term “dommages-intérêts.”
270. Schreiber v. Can., [2002] 3 S.C.R. 269, at para. 34.
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en cas de décès ou d’atteinte à l’intégrité physique d’une personne, ou en cas de dommage ou de perte d’un bien corporel.”271
Relevant secondary sources use similar language. For example, the Explanatory Reports on the European Convention on
State Immunity state:
ENGLISH
Where there has been injury
to the person or damage to
property, the rule of nonimmunity applies equally to
any concomitant claims for
non-material damage resulting
from
the
same
acts….Where there has been
no physical injury and no
damage to tangible property,
the article does not apply.

FRENCH
En cas de dommage corporel
ou materiel, le règle de la nonimmunité s’applique également
aux demandes en réparation
du préjudice moral résultant
du même fait….Lorsque aucune lésion corporelle ou autre
atteinte à l’intégrité physique
d’une personne, ni aucun dégât
à une chose n’ont été causés
[sic], l’article est inapplicable.272

The International Law Commission’s commentaries on article 12 of the Draft Articles state that loss of immunity does not
occur if “there is no physical damage. Damage to reputation or
defamation is not personal injury in the physical sense / il n’y a
pas de dommage corporel ou physique. Ni la diffamation ni
l’atteinte à la réputation ne sont une atteinte à la personne au
sens physique du terme.”273
The language used in these international materials corresponds closely to the language used in section 6, particularly in
the English version.274 Given the purpose of the Act, the language used and the presumption of compliance with international law, it is plausible to conclude that “personal injury /
dommages corporels” is intended to have its international law
meaning, namely physical injury.
A second unijural way of reading section 6 is to treat “personal injury” as a common law concept and “dommages cor271. Id. at para. 35.
272. Id. at para. 47.
273. Id.
274. The English language sources consistently refer to “personal injury” or
“injury to the person” while some the French language sources refer to “dommage corporel.”
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porels” as a French rendering of the common law concept.
Whereas the expression “personal injury” is widely used in
common law, the expression “dommages corporels” is not widely
used in civil law. In civil law, injury is referred to as “préjudice”, and the civil law analogue to “personal injury” is not
“dommages corporels” but rather “préjudice corporel” or “lésions
et blessures corporelles.”275 “Dommages corporels” could therefore be regarded as an attempt (albeit an awkward attempt276) to
render the common law concept in French. The problem with
this analysis is that “dommages corporels” does not correspond
accurately with the broader and vaguer notion of “personal injury” in common law.
A third unijural way of reading section 6 is to treat “dommages corporels” as a civil law concept and “personal injury” as
an English rendering of the civil law concept. One problem
with this analysis is that the concept of “dommages corporels” is
not an established term of art in civil law. As noted above, references to personal injury generally use the term “prejudice,”
while references to heads of damage generally use the term
“dommages-intérêts.” Moreover, even supposing that “dommages corporels” was a civil law term of art, and the drafter’s
task was to render that concept in English, he or she would
have chosen a term like “physical damage” or “bodily harm.”
The term “personal injury” would be avoided because its ordinary meaning is too broad and its legal meaning unclear.
In my view, an analysis of the sort set out above must be carried out before section 8.2 of the Interpretation Act is applied.
That is, before concluding that the language used contains civil
law and common law terminology or that the terminology used
has a different meaning in the civil law and the common law,
the court must carry out an interpretive exercise where an effort is made to determine the appropriate legal context(s). In
this case, applying this approach, I would conclude that the
terms “personal injury / dommages corporels” should be given
their meaning at international law, namely bodily injury.

275. See, e.g., Civil Code of Québec, ch. 64, art. 1457, 1991 S.Q. (Can.).
276. “Personal injury” (like “préjudice corporel” and “atteinte à la personne”)
refers to a cause of action whereas “dommages corporels” refers to a head of
damage. For some reason, this issue was not addressed when § 6 was revised
under the harmonization program.
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The Supreme Court of Canada reached this very conclusion,
but on different grounds, and its reasoning is problematic in my
view. One problem is that the court does not expressly address
the issues of whether the language to be interpreted is legal or
ordinary and whether it is unijural or bijural. A second, more
serious problem is that the court confounds the principles governing interpretation of bilingual legislation with the principles
governing the interpretation of bijural legislation.277
In its analysis of the term “personal injury / dommages corporels,” the court notes that the expression “personal injury” is
potentially broader than “dommages corporels” and could be
taken to include injury to dignity, autonomy or reputation as
well as physical injury.278 Given this ambiguity, the court decides to base its conclusion on the rules governing the interpretation of the bilingual legislation. It writes:
A principle of bilingual statutory interpretation holds that
where one version is ambiguous and the other is clear and unequivocal, the common meaning of the two versions would a
priori be preferred….Furthermore, where one of the two versions is broader than the other, the common meaning would
favour the more restricted or limited meaning….
In the case at bar, the French version, which states that the
exception to state immunity is “déces” or “dommages corporels”
is, as we shall see, the clearer and more restrictive version
compared to the English “death” or “personal injury. 279

In order to see the problem with this analysis, it may be helpful to reproduce the text of section 6(a):

277. This problem was brought to my attention by Anne-Marie Hébert, Senior Counsel, Department of Justice, Canada.
278. Id. at para. 39.
279. Id. at para. 56.
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6. A foreign state is not im- 6. L’État étranger ne bénéficie
pas de l’immunité de jurimune from the jurisdiction
diction dans les actions déof a court in any proceedcoulant
ings that relate to
(a) des décès ou dommages
(a) any death or personal
corporels survenus au
injury, or
Canada;
(b) any damage to or loss of
(b) des dommages matériels
property that occurs in
survenus au Canada.
Canada.
Let us assume, as the court does, that “personal injury” and
“dommages corporels” are legal terms of art from common law
and civil law respectively. Under the conventions for drafting
bijural legislation that prevailed when the State Immunity Act
was last revised, the English term “personal injury” expresses
the relevant common law concept and the French term “dommages corporels” expresses the relevant civil law concept.280
This would also be the result under section 8.2 of the Interpretation Act. These concepts could be identical, but they need not
be. If they are different, the common law meaning properly
governs in common law provinces and the civil law meaning
governs in Québec. That is the point of bijuralism. The court is
mistaken in applying the same meaning rule to this sort of
problem. In doing so, it effectively imposes unijuralism on what
is a bijural, or a potentially bijural, text.
The court’s confusion is clearly revealed when it suggests that
the interpretation of bijural legislation entails a search for a
common meaning:
Under the principles governing the interpretation of bilingual
and bijural legislation, where there is a difference between the
English and French versions, the court must search for the
common legislative intent which seeks to reconcile them. The
gist of this intellectual operation is the discovery of the essential concepts which appear to underlie the provision being interpreted and which will best reflect its purpose, when viewed
in its proper context.

280. See State Immunity Act, R.S.C., ch. S-18, § 6(a) (1985) (Can.).

File: Sullivan4.23.04macro.doc

Created on: 4/23/2004 4:30 PM

Last Printed: 6/25/2004 12:37 PM

2004] MULTILINGUAL, MULTIJURAL LEGISLATION 1053
In this case, the French version is the clearer and more restrictive of the two versions. A failure to consider the key
ideas underpinning the French version might lead to a serious
misapprehension as to the scope of s[ection] 6(a). It would
broaden its scope of application to such an extent that the doctrine of state immunity could be said to have been largely abrogated, whenever a claim for personal injury is made.281

When interpreting legal terminology, it is appropriate to
search for a common legislative intent or a common underlying
concept only if the terminology to be interpreted is unijural. In
the case of a bijural text (bijural in the suppletive sense), the
court must not search for a common intent or a shared concept,
but rather must interpret the legal terminology in question
with reference to the legal system to which it belongs. In the
Schreiber case, the scope of the common law concept of “personal injury” should have been established relying exclusively
on common law sources; the meaning and scope of “dommages
corporels” in the civil law is irrelevant to the significance of the
term at common law. If it turned out that the concept of “personal injury” at common law was significantly broader than the
concept of “dommages corporels” at civil law, the broader concept should have prevailed. Because the facts occurred in Ontario and the law suit originated there, Ontario law (not Québec
law) is called upon to supplement federal legislation to the extent needed. Alternatively, had the facts occurred in Québec,
Québec law would be relied on.
The court’s mistake in Schreiber is to confound language with
legal system. The rule set out in the two language versions has
to be the same, but the content of the rule, if it is bijural in the
suppletive sense, may allow for a different legal result in different provinces.282 The advantage of using doublets as a drafting
technique is that it highlights the independence of language
and legal system: the common law and civil law terminology
appears in both language versions, indicating clearly to both
French and English readers that the rule may be different in
the common law provinces and Québec. When generic terminology is used, although it is less obvious, the same analysis
applies: the rule enacted by Parliament is the same in both lan281. Schreiber v. Can., [2002] 3 S.C.R. 269, at paras. 78–79.
282. See e.g., Furfaro-Siconolfi v. M.N.R., [1990] 2 F.C. 3.
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guage versions, but it allows for the application of civil law concepts, institutions and principles in Québec and common law
concepts, institutions and principles in the rest of Canada.
V. INTERPRETING HISTORICAL TREATIES
Interpreting legislation enacted in French and English to reflect both the civil law and the common law is challenging, but
manageable for most interpreters. With relatively modest effort, an Anglophone or Francophone interpreter can attain a
functional knowledge of the other language and legal system,
and having reached that plateau can work toward full biculturalism. The differences between French and English language, law and culture are significant, but there is much common ground.283 The same cannot be said when it comes to Aboriginal languages, law and culture. The treaties between First
Nations and the British Crown are a point of intersection between very different cultural traditions, each with its own way
of making and recording law.284
Like the enactments of a legislature, treaties are speech acts
— acts in which language is used as a means to achieve an end.
The speech act itself occurs at a particular place and at a moment that is ephemeral; however, because the speech act is recorded in a text, it becomes portable and more or less permanent.285 Historically, Canadian courts have responded to trea283. Both languages and cultures are grounded in European intellectual
history.
284. For discussion of Aboriginal ways of making and recording law, see
James Zion & Robert Yazzie, Indigenous Law in North America in the Wake of
Conquest, 20 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 55 (1997); John Borrows, Wampum in
Niagara; The Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal History and SelfGovernment, in ABORIGINAL AND TREATY RIGHTS IN CANADA (Michael Asch ed.
1997) [hereinafter Wampum in Niagara]; Sharon Venne, Understanding
Treaty 6: An Indigenous Perspective, in ABORIGINAL AND TREATY RIGHTS IN
CANADA 173–207 (Michael Asch ed. 1997); Leonard Rotman, Taking Aim at the
Canons of Treaty Interpretation in Canadian Aboriginal Rights Jurisprudence, 46 U.N.B.L.J. 12 (1997); With or Without, supra note 44; James (Sakej)
Youngblood Henderson, First Nations Legal Inheritances in Canada: The
Mikmaq Model, 23 MANITOBA L. J. 1 (1996); Maria Teresa Sierra, Indian
Rights and Customary Law in Mexico: A Study of the Nahuas in the Sierra de
Puebla, 29 L. & SOCIETY REV. 227 (1995); INDIGENOUS LAW AND THE STATE
Parts I & II (Bradford Morse & Gordon Woodman, eds. 1998).
285. Speech act analysis was introduced by John Austin. JOHN L. AUSTIN,
HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1975). It was developed by John Searle,
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ties between First Nations and the Crown as if they were unilingual, unijural acts, recorded in unilingual, unijural documents.286 However, the written English text (with its ceremony
of signature) is only the European version of the treaty; it tells
only half the story of what is in essence a bilingual, bijural
agreement and record of agreement. The other half of the story
is told by the ceremonies and texts of the First Nations involved, including generally an exchange of presents, and in
every case, the account of the treaty told by the elders and
passed from one generation to the next.287
At the Treaty of Niagara, for example, the primary ceremony
was the exchange of wampum.288 Wampum consists of beads
sewn onto hide in patterns. It was used by eastern First Nations to record agreements, laws and events.289 The wampum
exchanged at Niagara was a two-row wampum belt, signifying
that the treaty was a peace and friendship treaty as opposed to
a land surrender.290 The way in which the beads were arranged

most notably in, JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LANGUAGE (1969). For an introduction to speech acts as they relate to legislation, see FREDERICK BOWERS, LINGUSITIC ASPECTS OF LEGISLATIVE
EXPRESSION 17–48 (1989).
286. In no case, to my knowledge, has a superior court considered a treaty to
be a bilingual or bijural text. For discussion of the need to treat treaties as a
bicultural text, see James Tully, Reconsidering the B.C. Treaty Process, in
LAW COMMISSION OF CANADA, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: A TREATY FORUM 11–
12 (2001) [hereinafter SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER].
287. See John Borrows, Negotiating Treaties and Land Claims: The Impact
of Diversity Within First Nations Property Interests, 12 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS
JUST. 179, 192 (1992).
First Nations sovereignty was exercised through the spoken word and
Wampum belts, and not through written statements. The reception
of presents was also a part of the traditional ceremonial and oral nature of treaties. The gathering for presents provided an opportunity
to meet in council and exchange words and material goods to reaffirm
or modify previous long agreements according to changing conditions.
This explains why First Nation leaders would travel such long distances to receive a few trinkets that were monetarily of trivial value.
Id. See also Delia Opekokew & Alan Pratt, The Treaty Right to Education in
Saskatchewan, 12 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 3, 28 (1992).
288. See Wampum in Niagara, supra note 284, at 163–65.
289. Rotman, supra note 284, at 17–18, nn. 23–24.
290. Wampum in Niagara, supra note 284, at 163. Robert Williams interprets the two-row wampum as follows:
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in the wampum constitutes an Aboriginal text that supports the
group’s memory of and repeated telling of the treaty through its
elders.291
Sharon Venne describes the process by which Treaty 6 between the Plains Cree Peoples and the British Crown was concluded. At the treaty signing, the ceremonies included the
smoking of the pipe and the whittling of ten sticks, representing
the promises exchanged by the parties.292 These sticks were
preserved in a bundle, along with other objects associated with
the treaty process. The Elder picked up each object in the bun-

When the Haudenosaunee first came into contact with the European
nations, treaties of peace and friendship were made. Each was symbolized by the Gus-Wen-Tah, or Two Row Wampum. There is a bed
of white wampum which symbolizes the purity of the agreement.
There are two rows of purpose, and those two rows have the spirit of
your ancestors and mine. There are three beads of wampum separating the two rows and they symbolize peace, friendship and respect.
These two rows will symbolize two paths or two vessels, travelling
down the same river together. One, a birch bark canoe, will be for
the Indian people, their laws, their customs and their ways. The
other, a ship, will be for the white people and their laws, their customs and their ways. We shall each travel the river together, side by
side, but in our own boat. Neither of us will try to steer the other’s
vessel.
Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of
Decolonization Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986
WIS. L. REV. 219, 291 (1986), quoted in Wampum in Niagara, supra note 284,
at 164. See also Rotman, supra note 284, at 17–19.
291. Wampum in Niagara, supra note 284, at 165.
292. Venne, supra note 284, at 203–04. Venne writes:
At the treaty signing, the white man made ten promises stating that
they would never be broken as long as the sun shines and the waters
flow. The commissioner said that … no two-legged person could ever
break those promises. An Elder by the name of Pakan (who was one
of the signatories of Treaty 6, and a Chief of the Whitefish Lake Reserve) expressed concern about how Indigenous peoples could preserve the same information. He stated that the white man had a way
in which he could preserve his knowledge about the treaties by writing them on paper.
He pointed to the land, which was full of buffalo, and at the animals.
He stated, “Our Father gave all that to us. Are you sure that you will
fulfil your promises? I will make ten sticks….We will keep the sticks
to signify your promises.”
Id.
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dle as he told the story of the treaty to Venne, ending with the
promises signified by the sticks.
Venne also offers an account of the means by which history is
preserved in the Cree oral tradition.
The Elders have within their memories a collective history.
No one Elder has all the information about a particular event;
each has a personal memory which embraces their parents’ or
grandparents’ memory of the details and circumstances of
events that took place.293

Keeping the stories through a number of memory lines ensures accuracy,294 as does the wealth of detail included in the
stories.295
The Aboriginal record of historical treaties is embedded in the
relevant Aboriginal literacy and draws on the knowledge, categories and norms of the relevant Aboriginal culture.296 This record is no less authentic, or legitimate, and arguably no less
accurate than the texts produced by the English-speaking representatives of the Crown. It follows that the treaties between
First Nations and the British Crown, like the statutes enacted
by the Canadian Parliament, are bilingual, bijural “enactments”
— recorded speech acts — from which a shared set of terms
must be constructed. This creates a serious challenge for Canadian courts, staffed by judges with little to no knowledge of
Aboriginal language or culture.
In recent years, the response to this challenge has been wellintentioned but timid. The reality of cultural differences has
been acknowledged by the courts:
These treaties were the product of negotiation between very
different cultures and the language used in them probably
does not reflect, and should not be expected to reflect, with total accuracy each party’s understanding of their effect at the
293. Id. at 177.
294. Id. at 176.
295. Id. at 174–76. See also H. Patrick Glenn, A Chthonic Legal Tradition:
To Recycle the World, in LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD (Oxford University
Press 2000); LEON SHELEFF, THE FUTURE OF TRADITION: CUSTOMARY LAW,
COMMON LAW AND LEGAL PLURALISM (2000); WALTER ONG, ORALITY AND
LITERACY: THE TECHNOLOGIZING OF THE WORD (1982).
296. See David Barton & Mary Hamilton, Literacy Practices, in SITUATED
LITERACIES: READING AND WRITING IN CONTEXT 7–15 (David Barton et al. eds.
2000).
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time they were entered into. This is why the courts must be
especially sensitive to the broader historical context in which
such treaties were negotiated. They must be prepared to look
at that historical context in order to ensure that they reach a
proper understanding of the meaning that particular treaties
held for their signatories at the time.297

The necessary historical context is established through contemporaneous journals, letters and reports (filtered through the
European sensibility of the author) as well as more recent historical and anthropological study (some of it by Aboriginal historians).298 The oral histories of Aboriginal peoples have also
been accepted as evidence of historical practices, customs and
traditions.299 In Mitchell v. MNR, Chief Justice McLachlin emphasized the importance of such evidence. At the same time,
however, she issued a caveat suggesting that the Aboriginal
record would have to give way to common law rules of evidence
and European-based notions of common sense:
The requirement that courts interpret and weigh the evidence
with a consciousness of the special nature of aboriginal claims
is critical to the meaningful protection of s[ection] 35(1) rights.
As [Chief Justice] Lamer observed in Delgamuukw, the admission of oral histories represents a hollow recognition of the
aboriginal perspective where this evidence is then systematically and consistently undervalued or deprived of all independent weight….Thus, it is imperative that the laws of evidence operate to ensure that the aboriginal perspective is
“given due weight by the courts.”
Again, however, it must be emphasized that a consciousness of
the special nature of aboriginal claims does not negate the operation of general evidentiary principles. While evidence adduced in support of aboriginal claims must not be undervalued, neither should it be interpreted or weighed in a manner
that fundamentally contravenes the principles of evidence law,
which, as they relate to the valuing of evidence, are often synonymous with the “general principles of common sense.”300

Although the courts accept various forms of extrinsic evidence, including oral history, they have not relied on it as a ba297.
298.
299.
300.

R. v. Horseman, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901, 907.
See Rotman, supra note 288, at 35–41.
See SULLIVAN & DRIEDGER, supra note 49, at 419–20.
Mitchell v. MNR, [2001] S.C.R. 911, paras. 37–39.
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sis for establishing the text of the treaty. It is regarded rather
as supplying historical context for the English language, common law-based text.301 The assimilationist imbalance created by
this approach is then compensated for first by emphasizing the
honour of the Crown and its fiduciary duty to Aboriginal peoples and second by adopting special rules for interpreting the
English text.302 The honour of the Crown means that “it must
always be assumed that the Crown intends to fulfil its promises. No appearance of ‘sharp dealing’ will be sanctioned.”303
The special rules require the text of the treaty to be interpreted
liberally, avoiding legal technicalities and resolving any ambiguity in favour of the First Nation.304 The language of the treaty
must be interpreted as it would have been understood by the
Aboriginal signatories at the time the treaty was signed.305
While this recognition of difference and the need for an appropriate response to difference is a significant advance, the
court stops short of addressing the fundamental point. No less
than a federal enactment, a treaty between a First Nation and
the Crown is a bilingual, bijural speech act that is recorded in
separate versions, both of which must be regarded as equally
authentic constituents of the treaty text.306 Because nonAboriginal Canadians (including lawyers and judges) are ignorant of Aboriginal law and culture, the courts cannot take judicial notice of the Aboriginal version of the text as they do of the
English and French versions of federal legislation. However,
they can establish the Aboriginal text as a fact through the re301. See, e.g., Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911; R. v. Marshall, [1999]
3 S.C.R. 456. See generally SULLIVAN & DRIEDGER, supra note 49, at 420.
302. For a general account of the principles governing the interpretation of
treaties, see SULLIVAN & DRIEDGER, supra note 49, at 416–20. See also James
Youngblood Henderson, Interpreting Sui Generis Treaties, 36 ALBERTA L. REV.
46 (1997); Rotman, supra note 284; Empowering Treaty Federalism, supra
note 30.
303. R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771, para. 41. See also R. v. Sparrow,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 1107–1108, 1114; R. v. Taylor, [1981] 34 O.R.2d 360,
367.
304. The leading cases are Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29, 36
and R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 1107.
305. R. v. Horseman, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901, 907; R. v. Badger, [1996] S.C.R.
771, 798–800.
306. See J. Edward Chamberlin, Culture and Anarchy in Indian Country, in
3 ABORIGINAL AND TREATY RIGHTS IN CANADA 18–19, 36–37 (Michael Asch, ed.
1997).
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ception of appropriate evidence and through the development of
appropriate principles for assessing the value of that evidence.
Obviously, reliance on European common sense, which is said to
underlie Canadian evidence law, will not serve for that purpose.
Rather, the courts must rely on people with expertise in the
relevant Aboriginal languages and literacies; they must master
the rhetoric of Aboriginal artefacts and the oral tradition. This
is not an easy thing to do, but it is possible; and it is made easier by the resurgence of oral culture in the Twentieth Century
(through radio, telephone, television) and by the integration of
oral and print culture that is achieved in much electronic communication and in modern document design.307
Having established the treaty text, the court must then reconcile the Aboriginal and European versions. Given that treaties derive their legitimacy from the voluntary consent of both
parties to a shared understanding,308 dialogue and integration
must be the preferred approach to treaty interpretation. The
terms of the treaty must be constructed out of both versions
with due regard to the context of both. What courts may discover through such dialogue is that whereas the oral tradition is
less uncertain than imagined, the certainties of the written text
are in many respects illusory. Certainly there is no reason to
treat the European version of the text as a more reliable or apt
expression of the original speech act. British and Canadian archival material shows the extent to which the formal record of
at least some historical treaties differs from the account of the
treaties set out in contemporaneous diaries and reports of
Europeans who negotiated them.309 Quite apart from such discrepancies, however, the courts must acknowledge the inherent
307. See, e.g., JAMES O’DONNELL, AVATARS OF THE WORD: FROM PAPYRUS TO
CYBERSPACE (1998); CHRISTIAN VANDENDORPE, DU PAPYRUS A L’HYPERTEXTE:
ESSAI SUR LES MUTATIONS DUE TEXTE ET DE LA LECTURE [FROM PAPYRUS TO HYPERTEXT: AN ESSAY ON THE EVOLUTION OF TEXT AND READING] (1999); David
Howes, E-Legislation: Law-Making in the Digital Age, 47 MCGILL L. J. 39
(2001). However, empirical studies show, breaking out of one’s own cultural
prison is harder than one might think. See MICHAEL CLYNE, INTERCULTURAL
COMMUNICATION AT WORK: CULTURAL VALUES IN DISCOURSE (1994).
308. For discussion of what gives legitimacy to treaties, see Roderick A.
Macdonald, By Any Other Name …, in SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER, supra note
286, at 77 & n.2.
309. See Wampum in Niagara, supra note 284, at 164–65; Rotman, supra
note 284 at 35–40.
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limitation of all texts. The language of an English record of a
treaty, no less than the language of a wampum belt, requires
interpretation with all that interpretation entails — inference,
assumption, guesswork. There is no justification for grounding
that interpretation in a single version of the text and a single
cultural tradition.
VI. THE LEGISLATION OF NUNAVUT
Legislation in Nunavut is prepared in English, French, Inuktituk and Innunnaqtun (a dialect of Innuktitut).310 However, it
is enacted in English and French only; the Inuktitut versions
merely have the status of translations.311 This situation in
unlikely to prevail for long.312 Inuktitut is the language spoken
by a majority of the population of Nunavut, and it is the working language of the legislature.313 A good deal of work has already been done to standardize the language and to develop
legal vocabulary.314 Under its constitution, the Legislative Assembly has the authority to enact laws for the preservation, use
and promotion of the Inuktitut language;315 proposals to require
enactment in Inuktitut have already come before the legislative
committee responsible for language matters.316

310. See LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF NUNAVUT, BILLS & LEGISLATION, at
http://www.assembly.nu.ca/english/bills/aboutbills.html. (last visited Mar. 18,
2004).
311. Id.
312. See Special Committee to Review the Official Languages Act, Final
Report, Sixth Session First Legislative Assembly, Legislative Assembly of
Nunavut 16–17 (Dec. 2003), available at http://www.assembly.nu.ca/english/
committees/languages/final_eng.pdf. For a contrary view, see Charles Marecic, Nunavut Territory: Aboriginal Governing the Canadian Regime of Governance, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 275, 292 (1999-2000).
313. See Legislative Assembly of Nunavut, supra note 312, at 5 app. III.
314. See, e.g., Table of Inuktitut and Innunnaqtun terminology for English
terms used in collecting government statistics. GOVERNMENT OF NUNAVUT,
RECOMMENDED TERMS, at http://www.gov.nu.ca/Nunavut/stw.html (last visited
Mar. 18, 2004). See generally Nunavut Living Dictionary available at
http://livingdictionary.com (last visited Mar. 18, 2004).
315. Nunavut Act, S.C., ch. 28, § 23(1)(n) (1993) (Can.).
316. See Recommendations regarding changes to the Official Languages
Act, submitted to the Special Committee of the Legislative Assembly Reviewing the Official Languages Act (Jan. 18, 2002) available at http://www.langcom.nu.ca/english/pressreleases/ChangesOLAJan30.pdf.
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The impetus to enhance the status and expand the use of
Inuktitut is closely tied to the goal of preserving and enhancing
Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit — “I.Q.” for the benefit of southerners,
as residents of Canadian provinces are called by those who live
in the Territories. I.Q. is usually translated as “traditional
Inuit knowledge.” A more telling translation, I suspect, would
be “the knowledge and norms of the Inuit tradition.”317
An essential component in preserving and promoting I.Q. is
promoting the role of Elders in Nunavut institutions, including
the legislature, government, schools and courts. Elders are
consulted by the government in the preparation of legislation,318
and the Legislative Assembly sets aside twelve seats for Elders
inside its chambers.319 Their role is to facilitate the integration
of I.Q. into Nunavut’s legislation and to ensure compatibility
between new legislative initiatives and Innuit tradition. Their
participation in the legislative process establishes the legal relevance and legitimacy of Inuit cultural norms. The “wisdom of
the Elders” thus becomes part of the legislative history of
particular enactments and Inuit knowledge and culture becomes a necessary legal context for the interpretation of Nunavut legislation.
An example of this is the research into I.Q. carried out in developing conflict of interest legislation for the Territory. A researcher was asked to produce an overview of any Inuit norms
and procedures relevant to the proposed legislation.320 She re317. “IQ is a set of practical truisms about the interrelationships between
nature and society that have been passed orally from one generation to the
next. It is a holistic, dynamic and cumulative approach to knowledge, teaching and learning.” Honourable Paul Okalik, Speech to the Conference on
Governance, Self Government and Legal Pluralism 3 (Apr. 23, 2003), available at http://www.gov.nu.ca/Nanavut/English/premier/press/cgsglp/shtml.
318. See Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit Katimajiit Established, available at
http://www.gov.nu.ca/Nunavut/English/news/2003/sept/sept8a.shtml
(last
visited Mar. 4, 2004) (announcing the establishment of the Inuit Oaujimajatuqangit Katimajiit, a council consisting of eleven community representatives who will advise the government on how to reflect IQ in policy development, delivery of programs and services, and day to day operations).
319. The Legislative Assembly of Nunavut operates on a consensus model.
This means that there is no party affiliation and consequently no party discipline. The prime minister is elected by majority vote.
320. Patricia File, Inuit Traditional Knowledge and Conflict of Interest:
Review of Conflict of Interest Legislation Applicable to Members of the Legislative Assembly of Nanvut, in REPORTS AND DECISIONS OF THE INTEGRITY
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lied on written accounts of past interviews with Elders as well
as her own personal interviews.321 The names of the Elders she
interviewed are appended to the report, which sets out in list
form relevant Inuit values, principles and processes.322 The
statement of purpose in the resulting legislation declares that
the purpose of the Act is to affirm commitment to the common
good in keeping with traditional Nunamummiut values and
democratic ideals.323 At the least, this report forms part of the
legislative history of the enactment; arguably that history extends to the views of the Elders interviewed by the researcher.324
I.Q. plays a more prominent and direct role in Nunavut’s proposed Wildlife Act.325 Section 1(1) announces the purpose of the
Act: to establish a comprehensive regime for managing wildlife
and habitat in the Territory.326 Section 1(2) sets out a list of
values which the Act is intended to uphold in fulfilling its purpose, including various principles of I.Q.327
In the definition section, Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit is defined
as “traditional Inuit values, knowledge, behaviour, perceptions
and expectations.”328 Section 8 then sets out thirteen principles
COMMISSIONER
FOR
CULTURE
OF
INTEGRITY,
available
at
http://www.integritycom.nu.ca/English/Reports/culture-integrity-4-IQ.html
(last visited Mar. 18, 2004).
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. See MODEL ACT § I(8).
324. For discussion of the admissibility and use of legislative history in
Canada, see SULLIVAN & DRIEDGER, supra note 49, at 481.
325. Wildlife Act, S.Nu., ch. 26 (2003) (Can.), available at http://www.Nun
avut-parks.com/bulletin_board/pdf/Wildlife%20Act%20%2D%20Chapter%20
26%20%2D%20English%2Epdf [hereinafter Wildlife Act] (last visited Mar. 18,
2004).
326. Id.
327. Section 1.(2) of the Wildlife Act states:
1.(2) To fulfill its purpose, this Act is intended to uphold the following
values:
(a) wildlife and habitat should be managed comprehensively
since humans, animals and plants in Nunavut are all interconnected;…
(f) the guiding principles and concepts of Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit are important to the management of wildlife and habitat
and should be described and made an integral part of this Act;
Wildlife Act, S.Nu., ch. 26, § 1.(2) (2003 ) (Can.).
328. Id.
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and concepts intended to guide the interpretation and application of the Act. Section 9 further indicates how seven of these
principles are to be understood by official interpreters in administering and applying the Act. For example:
9(1) The Government of Nunavut, the NWMB…and every conservation officer and wildlife guardian must follow the principle of Pijitsirniq when performing their functions under this
Act.
(2) Although the principle of Papattiniq traditionally applied
to objects rather than living things, because the Government
of Nunavut and the NWMB have responsibilities to conserve
wildlife, they must endeavour to apply the principle of Papattiniq to wildlife and habitat and conserve these resources for
future generations of Nunvummiut.
…
(7) Because of the unique challenges facing Nunavut, this Act
must be interpreted and applied in a way that respects the
principle of Qanuqtuurunnarniq.

Finally, section 3(3) declares that “Inuktitut, or the appropriate dialect of Inuktitut, may be used to interpret the meaning of
any guiding principle or concept of Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit
used in this Act.”329
In effect, sections 8 and 9 of the Wildlife Act incorporate by
reference a body of knowledge that is contained within an Inuktitut-based oral tradition, as opposed to a written set of standards. At first glance, this seems extraordinary. But it can also
be understood as part of the ordinary evolution of the instruments of governance in western democracies. It is increasingly
common for Western legislatures to incorporate by reference
technical standards developed by independent national or international bodies.330 The effect is to make the incorporated set
of standards legally binding on the persons to which the Act
applies. This drafting technique creates access problems, particularly if the incorporated standards are subject to copyright
(as they often are) and if they are drafted in only one language
(as is often the case). The Supreme Court of Canada has toler329. Id.
330. See Sullivan Observations, supra note 58. For discussion, see JOHN
MARK KEYES, EXECUTIVE LEGISLATION 269–70 (1992).
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ated these access problems, presumably because the benefits of
mandating shared technical standards outweighs the cost of
access problems and the disregard of community.331 A similar
cost-benefit analysis should apply to the incorporation of an
Inuktitut-based, oral tradition into Nunavut law.
At present, the government of Nunavut appears to have decided that the benefits of a legal regime that relies on oral tradition outweighs the costs of sustaining and providing access to
that tradition. These costs could be considerable. Incorporation
of knowledge grounded in an oral tradition is feasible only if
there is reason to believe in the ongoing viability of that tradition. Ironically, the creation of Nunavut (designed to reflect
and sustain Inuit culture and the Inuit way of life) exposes the
Inuit people to the pressures of the south and to globalization
generally.332 If Nunavut is to have a Wildlife Act that depends
on the knowledge embodied in its oral tradition, the government must provide support to ensure the continued viability of
the tradition — such as elders participating in the education
system.
The Wildlife Act has not been enacted but it is likely to be reintroduced in the next session of the Legislative Assembly.
What remains to be seen is how the courts, which are likely to
be staffed by English-speaking, non-Aboriginals for many years
to come, will respond to the discursive form of drafting and to
the obligation to consult elders to determine the content of the
law. When the occasion to respond arises, it will not be business as usual. Even though the Act is authentic in English and
French only, it tells interpreters that it is to be treated as a
multilingual, multijural text with special emphasis on the languages and norms of the Nunamummiut. It imposes a legal
obligation on interpreters to educate themselves, and to receive
evidence about the culture of the other. Further, by departing
from the drafting conventions observed by most Canadian (and
Commonwealth) legislatures, it invites interpreters to develop
new canons of interpretation.

331. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
332. To become self-governing within the Canadian federation, the Inuit
must master the governance structures used by the other governments of the
federation.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Wildlife Act is extraordinary in its explicit attempt to incorporate Inuit language, knowledge and norms into Europeanstyle positive law. It not only permits, but requires dialogue
between the oral tradition of the Inuit and the print-based tradition of European language and law. To rise to the challenges
posed by this legislation, an official interpreter must be a multilingual, multicultural superhero. Alternatively, he or she must
rely on help from appropriate experts. In the case of legislation
such as Nunavut’s Wildlife Act, the most important experts are
the Elders who are the repositories of the incorporated traditional knowledge. Eliciting what they know in this context is
comparable to reading standards incorporated by a Railway
Safety Act, and relying on expert testimony to explain the terminology and underlying science.
The need to rely on experts is obvious when a court staffed by
white judges, operating in a European-based tradition, is called
on to interpret legislation that expressly requires knowledge of
Aboriginal culture and traditions. However, the need is not
confined to such cases. Arguably, any time a court that is not
itself fully multilingual or multijural interprets a multilingual
text or deals with a multijural matter, it is obliged to seek expert assistance from those who are able to compare and bridge
the relevant legal and cultural traditions. Ideally such assistance would be part of the ongoing professional training offered
to judges and would also be solicited through amicus curiae
briefs. At the least, expert testimony by linguists, anthropologists, historians, Elders and the like should be routinely admissible in statutory interpretation cases. Testimony of this sort is
invaluable in drawing attention to the complexities of interpretation and in particular to the ways in which language and law
interact with cultural context. Most importantly, such testimony helps the court to recognize difference, to engage in dialogue, and in the end, perhaps to achieve a measure of integration.

